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[T]ranssexuality is not new. It has existed in every culture, in every
society, for as long as there have been humans. In traditional
Plains Native society in America and Canada, tribes had Berdache.
These were transsexuals - persons who had been of the genital
anatomy of one sex and experienced themselves as another. The
tribe gave them a special, even mystical, place. They were seen as
the gender of their experience, not their anatomy. Instead of be-
ing outcasts, they were honored, were able to marry and take their
place in society. This tradition goes back thousands of years. It
speaks to the backwardness of European tradition, that we have
such a hard time integrating difference in our society.
AUTHOR PREFACE
Marriages, queers, and legal discourse: is recognition of same-sex marriage
a bomb we want to drop on the united states.e On ourselves? Before the issue
of same-sex marriages is decided nationwide," a number of legal perversions
should be acknowledged and addressed by the queer rights movement.4 Ra-
tionales used to prevent lesbians and gays3 from manying are generally prem-
ised on, among other arguments, repugnant and archaic stereotypes regarding
procreation, religious edicts, and child rearing. Transsexuals, on the other
hand, may be able to many, but only if they can prove they are anatomically
capable of fulfilling legally prescribed sexual roles within their marriages.
Upon closer analysis, the root of the problem is patriarchy - the system of male
supremacy that requires ubiquitous male presence and domination, even in
the family. Volumes have been devoted to the conflict between patriarchal ide-
ology and same-sex marriages, but relatively little attention has been paid to
the issue of transsexual marriages. This paper will analyze how far the law
will go to maintain the status quo, requiring one male per legally recognized
union. In their most absurd terms, patriarchal constructs such as marriage
and family are reinforced through law using what I call the one-penis-per-
union rule.
In the following pages I am not advocating for the promotion of marriage
1. Laura Markowitz, Wen the Mirror Goes Wrong. An Interview with Gary Sanders, in IN THE
FAMILY, Oct. 1995, at 13 (quoting Gary Sanders).
2. This paper is about challenging gender as a binary construct in law. Rules and social
constructs are interwoven into every fabric of our lives. I purposely have not capitalized "united
states" throughout this paper to illustrate that fact. Why do we capitalize some words, but not
others? Who made up those rules?
3. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a ban on same-sex marriages
may violate the Equal Protection Clause and Equal Rights Amendment to Hawaii's constitution).
4. "Queer" refers to the entire community of sexual nonconformists, including transgen.
dered individuals, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and omnisexuals.
5. I include bisexuals in these groups when they are involved in same-sex relationships.
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as an institution or for queer rights to many. As the queer nation moves
closer to attaining the privileges and benefits of marriage reserved for hetero-
sexuals, the most heinous bases upon which these privileges are protected have
been overlooked by some camps. I suggest we consider what the transsexual
experience helps illuminate: the pervasiveness of patriarchy and heterosexual
privilege under law.6
I. INTRODUCTION
I has no gender. Neither does you. He and she definitely have a
specific gender which is very helpful to all of - us - because we
doesn't have a gender either. Does we? Back to he and she or
rather to him and to her. He is masculine except when he is uni-
versal and means him and her and all of - us, who has no gender
still. She is feminine, except of course when she is inanimate, like
a ship or a salad, but six of one, half a dozen of the other, am I
right? We still doesn't have a gender. You plural has no gender
either. Unlike him and her, they has no gender whatsoever, which
I will admit introduces some confusion, but we're almost finished
so live with it. It has no gender at all, except when it refers to an
infant about whose gender we are uncertain. Not unlike me. Or
you.
- Kate Bomstein, Hidden: A Gender7
Transsexuals in the united states are legally impossible beings. Ju-
dicial and legislative interpretations of transsexuals' existence deem
their lives, their relationships, and their realities inconceivable."
Courts insist that patriarchal, religious, and legally constructed insti-
tutions such as marriage and divorce, and the right to, or not to,
procreate are reserved solely for heterosexuals, not homosexuals, not
hermaphrodites, and not transsexuals. 9 The legal interpretation of
6. Many of the transsexual marriage and divorce cases cited in this paper are old and were
decided in the 1960s and 1970s. The law's erasure of transsexuals in marriage is a stagnant is-
sue that should be revived in academic debates, both in light of the current trend in some queer
camps' efforts to gain heterosexual privileges through marriage and in terms of recognizing pa-
triarchy and oppression in the law.
7. KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US 178 (1994)
(quoting Act I, Scene 4 of Bornstein's play, "Hidden: A Gender").
8. See Leslie Pearlman, Transexualism as Metaphor The Collision of Sex and Gender, 43 BUFF.
L. REV. 835, 839-40 (1995) (describing the problems transsexuals encounter, both before and
after surgery, in the legal and medical communities because the transsexual's gender does not
match his or her biological sex).
9. See Note, Patriarchy Is Such a Drag. The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gen-
der, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1973, 1980 (1995) (arguing that the institution of marriage and the right
to procreate are state-conceived notions rather than institutions that existed before the state
ordained them, and that the courts have used this distinction to deny non-heterosexuals the
right to marry).
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transsexuality at times limits acknowledgment of transsexual exis-
tence in relation to the presence or absence of a functional penis. At
other times, laws and litigators refuse to recognize transsexuals at
all.
10
Courts repeatedly classify individuals based on their genital anat-
omy, rather than on the individual's own gender perceptions." The
gendered experiences of transsexuals exist on a continuum, some-
where between male and female. 2 This concept of sexual continuity,
however, threatens the male-dominated power structure. As Martine
Rothblatt aptly argues, "[i]f there are no hard and fast sex types,
then there can be no apartheid of sex."'3 Because the legal, hetero-
patriarchal construct of marriage prescribes rigid sex and gender
roles, it denies transsexual reality, especially when transsexuality is
juxtaposed against heterosexual relationships.
In this paper, I will explore how laws regarding marriage, along
with other patriarchal constructs, are used to deny transsexual real-
ity. Part II briefly describes one transsexual's life under British law
and how the inconsistencies in British law parallel the legal treat-
10. See Pearlman, supra note 8, at 837-38 (explaining that courts often insist on categoriz-
ing transsexuals based on their biological sex and then expect transsexuals to fulfill gender roles
based on that sex).
11. In this paper I distinguish between sex and gender. The difference between sex and
gender may be understood as follows:
Sex is used in its realist, essentialist sense to mean a fundamental, natural, biological
determination of 'maleness' or 'femaleness' . . . gender, in contrast, is used in its con-
structivist, historical sense to mean a culturally determined, socially constructed, and
historically variant description of those acts that compose how an individual does
'being male' or 'being female.'
Pearlman, supra note 8, at 837 n.6 (quoting Druann Pagliasotti, On the Discursive Construction of
Sex and Gender, 20 COMM. RES. 472, 474-75 (1993)). See id. at 837-38 (observing that the legal
system has not differentiated between sex and gender in its definitions).
12. I use the term "transsexual" to mean those individuals in the transgendered movement
who are born with a sex - genitalia - that does not coincide with their gender identity. The
transgender movement is comprised of two types of persons: transsexuals and cross-dressers.
MARTINE ROT-mLATr, THE APARTHEID OF SEX 17 (1995). Transsexuals may "use sex hormones
and sometimes plastic surgery to change their anatomy toward the other sex type... [In addi-
tion to the thousands of transsexuals who have genital reconstruction surgery] many more than
this number simply use hormones to change their facial hair, voice, and physique." Id. Cross-
dressers, on the other hand, use clothing and attitude "to give the appearance of belonging to
the other sex or to an androgynous middle ground." Id. While both types of transgendered
people will fit within the analyses of this paper, I will concentrate primarily on transsexuals. See
generally Pearlman, supra note 8, at 840 (explaining that it is inaccurate to presume that there
are only two sexes).
13. RoTHBtuLTr, supra note 12, at 19. Rothblatt, a transsexual activist, argues that the doc-
trine of sexual continuity is threatening because it destroys the male-dominated power struc-
ture. Id.
14. By "transsexual reality," I am not suggesting that all transsexuals share a single, global
reality. Rather, I emphasize the fact that transsexuals exist in reality - a reality that cannot be
polarized and which has yet to be uncategoricaly recognized in law.
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ment of transsexuals in the united states in significant ways.'" Part III
examines several cases dealing with transsexual marriages in the
united states. In Part IV, I explain why the concept of a sexual family
is essential to patriarchal control and why courts are unwilling to in-
clude transsexual gender identities within that concept.16 In Part V, I
explore alternative legal standards that can be applied in cases in-
volving transsexuals. Rather than classifying individuals based on
their genitalia, courts should acknowledge one's gender identity, in
the context of recognizing relationships. In other areas, as in assign-
ing transsexuals to single-sex prisons, the need for binary sex classifi-
cation is perhaps more obvious. I argue, however, that even those
distinctions should disregard genitalia as a basis for classification and
should instead follow a gender identity model. I will offer no con-
clusion. Instead, Part VI, is an inception: by pulling together the
ideas proposed here, I encourage readers to continue considering
these issues, to question the phenomenon of polarization in law, and
to challenge legal norms and standards, even those which I propose.
As the following discussion proceeds, consider the situation of
Kate Bornstein, a political activist and transsexual. 7  Born into a
male body, Bornstein had surgery to re/construct her penis into a
vagina.' 8 She considered herself a lesbian and began dating Cather-
ine Harrison. 9 Catherine, however, recently had sex reassignment
surgery and is now David Harrison. 0 Considering how, where, and
why sex-based dichotomies are drawn in our legal system, can Born-
stein and Harrison get married? Moreover, do they, as a couple, ex-
ist under law? Sometimes? Ever?
15. An examination of treatment of transsexuals in the United Kingdom is useful in part
because one of the earliest legal tests developed to deny transsexual marriages is defined in a
British case, Corbett v. Corbett (orse. Ashley) 1971 p. 83. The Corbett test is alive and well in
many Europeanjurisdictions. It is used in a modified form in the united states, and it examines
three biological factors of transsexuality: 1) chromosomes; 2) gonads; and 3) genitalia at the
time of birth. Id. at 106. In Corbet, the judge found a post-operative female transsexual to be
male and declared her marriage to a congenital male null and void. Id.
16. I borrow and employ the concept of "sexual families" from Professor Martha Fineman.
The sexual family signifies the traditional concept of family, having "a unit with a heterosexual,
formally celebrated union at its core." See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TBWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143 (1995). See infra Part IV, dis-
cussing the connection between law's protection of the sexual family and its refusal to recognize
transsexual unions.
17. For a complete story of Bornstein's life, see her memoir, KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER
OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US (1994).
18. Id. at 16-17.
19. Id. at 225.
20. Id.
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II. U.K. AND GENDER CHOICE: NOWYOU SEE IT, NOWYOU DON'T
"Roles, blueprints, prescriptions ... It's all made-up and very,
very small ....It's what's between your ears that counts!"
"... then why'dja bother changin' your body?"
"That's a whole 'nother issuel For me it was like trying to swim
in a wedding gown! Very uncomfortable!"
- Diane DiMassa, Hothead Paisar2
1
Inconsistencies in Britain's laws illustrate how one European legal
scheme erases transsexual reality. When Caroline Cossey, known as
the model "Tula," had sex reassignment surgery2 2 in 1974, her physi-
cal metamorphosis from man to woman made herfeel simultaneously
male, female, and neither.2 Her experience under law was similar.
Tula's passport states that she is female, but her birth certificate des-
ignates her as male.24 The British health care system paid for her
surgery to construct female genitals,2s but if she commits a crime, she
21. Diane DiMassa, A Poke in the Park, HOTHEAD PAISAN, Issue 19, 1995, at 4.
22. In this context I use the phrase "sex reassignment surgery" as it is commonly used, to
refer to the "ultimate" genital re/construction - removal of the vulva and attachment of simula-
crum of a penis for female to male transsexuals or inversion of the penis to simulate a vagina for
male to female transsexuals. In reality, though, transsexuals may undergo a series of surgeries
to alter anatomy and may, in fact, never choose to re/construct their genitals. See infra note 180
(suggesting several levels of sex reassignment surgeries are available to most transsexuals). In
this paper I use the terms "postoperative" and "pre-operative" to identify individuals who have
or have not had genital re/construction. These words are in some ways misnomers, however,
because they draw a bright line distinction between male or female assignment based on genita-
lia rather than on gender identity. For a closer look at how "completed sex reassignment" may
be interpreted, see Part V.B.
23. Gretchen Edgren, The Transformation of Tula: Transsexual Caroline Cossey, PlAYBOY, Sept.
1991, at 102. My apologies to feminists opposing pornographic objectification of women. I ini-
tially retrieved this article from an electronic database.
24. Id.
25. Id. The fact that British health care pays for transsexual reassignment surgery elimi-
nates an important class issue that exists in the united states, which does not provide federally
funded health care coverage for this surgery. When courts declare that transsexuals must surgi-
cally conform their genitals to their gender identity, only those individuals who can afford the
costly series of surgeries involved in sex reassignment will even be considered under the law.
See, e.g., Jerold Taitz, Judicial Determination of the SexualIdentity ofPost-Operative Transsexuals: A New
Form of SexDiscrimination, 13 AM.J. L. & MED. 53, 55 (1987) (explaining the medical procedures
involved in such surgery are expensive, time-consuming, and risky for patients). In Rush v.John-
son, a post-operative female transsexual challenged a state's refusal to reimburse her for medical
bills related to her surgery. 565 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The court held that because sex
reassignment "constitutes major surgery with various attendant risks and complications," and
because medical professionals do not all agree that such surgery is "effective treatment for
transsexualism," sex reassignment surgery can be classified as "experimental." Id. at 868. The
state did not compensate individuals undergoing "experimental" surgery. See infra Part V.B.
(discussing health care and class issues related to sex reassignment surgery in the united states).
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will go to a male prison.'r She pays for health insurance at the
higher rate charged to women, but cannot collect her pension until
she's sixty-five, the age at which men can collect, although women
are able to collect at age sixty.2
After sex reassignment surgery, Tula began dating a man who,
with knowledge of her surgery, proposed marriage.28 They obtained
a marriage license without incident because no one asked to see her
birth certificate.2 Prior to their marriage, however, the government
attempted to bar the ceremony. 0 A few days before the wedding, the
lower court, in a ten to six decision, gave Tula permission to marry.31
Once tabloids aired news of their union, though, Tula's in-laws
82
urged her husband to divorce her, which he did. One year and
four months after Tula married, the European Court of Human
Rights heard the government's appeal to the lower decision and held
ten to eight against allowing Tula to change her birth certificate, and
fourteen to four against her right to marry. For two short months,
Tula was married - something British courts have now rendered a
legal impossibility.
26. Edgren, supra note 23, at 102. The implications of placing a male to female transsexual
in an all-male prison are highlighted in a recent Supreme Court case, Farmer v. Brennan, 114
S. Ct. 1970 (1994). In 1989, Dee Farmer was a pre-operative male to female transsexual exhibit-
ing "feminine characteristics" whom officials placed in a male prison, where an inmate beat and
raped her. 114 S. Ct. at 1975. The Court held that Farmer was not subjected to cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because prison officials "must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and [the officials] must also draw the inference." Id. at 1979. See supra Part V.B.
(discussing Farmer and other prison cases). See also RoTBIATr, supra note 12, at 62 (noting
that sex-based (mis) ciassifications have done nothing to prevent jail house rape).
27. Edgren, supra note 23, at 102.
28. Edgren, supra note 23, at 102.
29. Edgren, supra note 23, at 102.
30. Edgren, supra note 23, at 102.
31. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).
32. Edgren, supra note 23, at 102.
33. Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A). The Court in this case, as in other cases involving
transsexuals in the United Kingdom, declined to amnend her birth certificate or allow her to
marry, based primarily on the privacy clause of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. See, e.g., W. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 11095/84,63 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 34 (1989);J. v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 10622/83, 63 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 37 (1988); and Rees v. United
ingdom,106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (holding that while a name may be changed in other docu-
ments, the birth certificate cannot be amended if it reflects correct information at the time of
birth). In 1971, the House of Commons passed the Nullity of Marriage Act of 1971, which de-
dares any marriage of two parties who are not respectively female and male null and void.
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.III. MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A UNION MUST HAVE ONE
AND ONLY ONE PENIS
And gender is not sane.
It's not sane to call a rainbow black and white.
It's not sane to demand we fit into one or the other only.
It's not sane that we classify people in order to oppress
them as women or to glorify them as men.
Gender is not sane.
- Kate Bornstein
34
Arbitrary legal classifications constructed by the hierarchical legal
system in the united states are not new. 5 For example, most people
recall the landmark case of P/essy v. Ferguson 6 as involving a "separate
but equal" issue. Railway officers assigned Plessy, who "was seven-
eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood," to a car desig-
nated for black passengers pursuant to a Louisiana statute. Plessy,
whose "colored blood was not discernible in him," remained in a car
for white passengers until police forcibly removed and arrested
him. 8 Although he challenged the railway's actions and the statute
based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 9 the implications of Plessy's lawsuit went far beyond Constitu-
34. BORNsTEIN, supra note 7, at 123.
35. The following cases, for example, involved recognition and enforcement of arbitrary
classification schemes based on biological characteristics of women: Bledsoe v. Webb, 839 F.2d
1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding military policy grounded in archaic stereotypes and biological
determinism which excluded all women from combat positions and combat-related civil service
jobs); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that a statute restricting the number of
hours a woman may work per day does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Because women
are physically weaker than men and responsible for the reproduction of the human race, they
are "properly differentiated from the other sex and placed in a class by [themselves], and legis-
lation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary
for men and could not be sustained." Id. at 419420); and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 133
(1872) (supporting a state statute excluding women from admission to the Illinois Bar because
of women's reproductive capacity. "The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." Id. at 141
(Bradley,J., concurring)).
36. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
37. Id. at 540. The statute mandated that "[n]o person or persons, shall be admitted to
occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones, assigned to them on account of the race they be-
long to." Id. The Court then stated that Plessy had "insisted upon going into a coach used by
the race to which he did not belong." Id. at 541.
38. Id. at 541.
39. Plessy challenged the statute on Thirteenth Amendment "badge of inferiority" grounds
as well, but the Court cursorily rejected this assertion as inaccurate and thus, "too dear for ar-
gument." Id. The Court then rejected Plessy's Equal Protection claim, noting that racially dif-
ferent treatment does not violate the Constitution, as long as each race is treated equally, albeit
separately. Id.
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tional doctrine. 6 On a deeper level, the case challenged the arbi-
trary nature of racial classifications. 4' The issue at hand was whether
a person whose racial background is one-eighth black and seven-
eighths white could be categorized as black and then be denied con-
stitutional equality.4
Proponents of the view that law operates best as a system of bipo-
lar, albeit hierarchical, categorizations suggest that law "is obliged to
classify its material into exclusive categories; it is therefore, a binail
system designed to produce -conclusions of the yes or no type.
This theory reflects a sociological need for definitive categories, of-
ten referred to as classification anxiety.44 The ability to label others
creates order and eases this anxiety. In everyday encounters, we
mentally categorize strangers according to race, sex, and age, among
other things. Yet, as Plessy illustrates, categorization in law, particu-
larly where biology is a factor, can lead to arbitrary and unjust treat-
ment.
Categorization on the basis of sex and genitalia is another exam-
ple of biology and law in conflict.4 As natural as the binary, sex-based classification scheme of male and female may seem, these
40. Remarking on the true meaning of the Oregon statute, Justice Harlan stated, "[e]very
one knows that the statute in question had jts origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude
white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied or assigned to white persons." 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan further
criticized the statute and the majority's holding by asking:
If a state can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel
as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the
streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep to one side of a street,
and black citizens to keep on the other?
Id. at 558.
41. See Ruth Colker, Bi: Rae, Sexual Oientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1,
6 (1995) (explaining that Plessy was a "radical challenge to the construction of racial catego-
ties").
42. See id. at 5 (describing how attorney Albion Tourgee sought a "[n]egro whose complex-
ion was white or nearly white" with "mixed Caucasian and African blood, in the proportion of
one-eighth African and seven-eighths Caucasian." Id. at 6-7).
43. See Pearlman, supra note 8, at 843. A significant problem arises when law attempts to
classify biological phenomena, however. Medicine, for example, "cannot give Yes or No answers
... [p] eople are not either tall or short, they are taller or shorter or about average." Id. (citation
omitted). Hence, the conflict between law and biological phenomena.
44. See generaUy Pearlman, supra note 8, at 844-46 (explaining the law's fascination with sex
and gender categories and the challenge transsexuals pose to those constructs); see also
BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 3-4 (describing the sociological need to identify with recognizable
sex and gender categories).
45. See, e.g., ANNIE WOODHOUSE, FANTASTIC WOMEN: SEX, GENDER AND TRANsVTM 4-5
(1989) (noting that we categorize others in our minds because labels prevent confusion).
46. See Pearlman, supra note 8, at 845-46 (explaining how classification on the basis of gen-
der is a means of minimizing classification anxiety). Unfortunately, "[clulturally marked cate-
gories (of male and female) are made up of antiquated gender identities." Id. at 846.
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categories did not always exist in law. During the Renaissance,
when men commonly became eunuchs, for example, laws deter-
mined sex assignment through gender displays like clothing and be-
havior, rather than by genitals.4 Not until the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, when the "medical and legal community
became enthralled with genital determination,"4 did biological sex
determination override cultural gender determination." By the
twentieth century, laws reinforcing biological sex determination
based on genitalia were recognized as "'natural truths,' and the le-
gitimization of sex categorization was born."5'
One manifestation of sex categorization under law is apparent
when courts impose rigid genital classifications as prerequisites to
marriage. By controlling and manipulating the definition of mar-
riage, courts determine who may and may not marry based on an
unspoken but pervasive rationale which is, in effect, a one-penis-per-
union rule. Homosexuals cannot marry because lesbian couples do
not have the requisite penis, gay couples have too many. Trans-
47. For an insightful look at how law has created sex-based dichotomies and how legal
dogma has corrupted the body of woman, see Judith E. Grbich, The Body in Legal Theory, in AT
THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 65 (Martha Fineman & Nancy Thomad-
sen eds., 1991). From a poststructuralist perspective, for example, philosopherJacques Derrida
suggests it is a unique function of western thought to polarize categories like good vs. evil, right
vs. wrong, and male vs. female. Id. Some feminist legal theorists have taken Derrida's concept a
step further, seeking to identify not only why one polar category is privileged over another, as in
males over females, but also to identify how the privileges arose in the first place, through patri-
archal legal systems. Id. at 65-67.
48. See Pearlman, supra note 8, at 850 (noting that categorization based on genitals was
considered impossible due to the belief that "'one's genitals might change over [the course of]
one's life time,'" especially if men became eunuchs) Id. quoting Druann Pagliassotti, On theDis-
cursive Construction of Sex and Gender, 20 Comm. Res. 472, 474-75 (1993) (citation omitted). &e
also BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 48 (describing the concept of sex and gender continuums prac-
ticed in Shamanic cultures).
49. See Pearlman, supra note 8, at 850.
50. Pearlman, supra note 8, at 850. The categories were straightforward: "[p]enis equals
boy, vagina equals girl. Presence of (or absence of) the genital represented one's true sex." Id.
51. Pearlman, supra note 8, at 850.
52. See Note, supra note 9, at 1980 (arguing that the law plays an integral role in construct-
ing sexual identities). The author observes that "[i]t is only by sleight of hand that the Court
makes the divide between the cluster of heterosexual props - family, marriage, procreation -
on the one hand and gays and lesbians on the other seem obvious." Id. The trick is in address-
ingfamily, marriage, and procreation as if they are natural institutions that existed prior to state
intervention. Thus the law's construction of these categories is hidden. Id. at 1980-81. Upon
closer look, however, we can see that socially constructed laws are "the very source of the dis-
tinctions upon which [Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (ruling that the right to homo-
sexual sex is not a fundamental right)] was decided." Id.
53. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 22 (explaining how, in most cultures, gender assign-
ment begins at birth). Doctors look at newly born infants and either say, "It has a penis, it's a
boy," or "It doesn't have a penis, it's a girl." Id. "It has little or nothing to do with vaginas. It's
all penises or no penises: gender assignment is both phallocentric and genital. Other cultures
are not or have not been so rigid." Id.
Spring 1997] IMPOSSIBLE EXISTENCE
sexuals may alter their anatomy to fit the rule, but courts have consis-
tently and arbitrarily denied their physical qualifications. 54 The fol-
lowing discussion will look at how a few courts have viewed, indeed
erased, transsexual existence.
A. Name Changes and Birth Certificates
A long line of New York cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s in-
dicates that courts were willing to allow transsexuals to change their
names from traditionally male titles to traditionally female titles.55 In
most states today individuals can legally change their names without.... 56
judicial scrutiny, and receiving a new name on a birth certificate
poses no great hurdle.
7
What can be difficult, however, is changing the sexual classifica-
54. Pearlman identifies the significance behind conflating medical and legal determina-
tions of sex. The medical profession constructs the transsexual's new genitalia, or "true sex."
Then the legal community directs and restricts the ways transsexuals can live with their reas-
signed sex. "In essence, the medical community determines the status of biology, while the le-
gal community determines the status of one's body (how to live assigned to a particular sex)."
Pearlman, supra note 8, at 851.
55. Sep, e.g., Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (finding that the Bureau
of Vital Records was required to change a transsexual's name on a birth certificate, but not his
or her sex); Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (concluding that the Department of Health must change a transsexual's name on the
birth certificate); In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (allowing a male to female
transsexual to change her name from a male name to a female name); In the Matter of
Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 834 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (granting a male to female transsexual's request
to change her name to a traditionally female name and ordering the name change to be at-
tached to the birth certificate); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct
1966) (denying a transsexual's application to have her sex changed on her birth certificate but
not reaching the question of whether the male name could be changed to a female name).
56. The personal significance attached to a name, however, can be significant. In her
autobiography, Patty Duke recalled her feelings after the Rosses, her new caretakers, changed
her name: "[W]hen the Rosses said, 'Anna Marie's dead, your Patty now,' it was as if she really
did die ... That may seem like a lot of fuss over a bunch of letters strung together, but your
name is an important symbol." PAT1Y DUKE & KENNETH TURAN, CALL ME ANNA: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPYOFPATIYDUKE 28 (1987) (quoted in Suellyn Scarnecchia, Who IsJessica's Mother?
Defining Motherhood Through Reality, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 (1994)).
57. Most states require no administrative or offidal procedures to complete a name
change. In these states, a name is whatever one chooses, as long as that name is not used for
fraudulent purposes. See, e.g., ARE. CODE ANN. § 9-2-101 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (commenting
that the statute providing for legal procedures to change one's name is only "supplemental to
the common-law rule that one may ordinarily change his [sic] name at will, without any legal
proceedings, merely by adopting another name, that the right is not limited by the ordinary
rules of minority and that the section only affords another method of doing so"); IND. CODE
ANN. § 344-6-1 (1995) (providing simply that "the circuit courts in the several counties of this
state may change the names of natural persons on application by petition"); NEB. REV. STAT. §
71-640 (1996) (allowing a name change only once for a person over seven years old, such that
further name changes may be made upon written request for a court order).
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ion on a birth certificate.58 At first blush, this acknowledgment may
seem superfluous, but for a transsexual who wants to many, it can
make all the difference. In most cases, two individuals applying for a
marriage license must show birth certificates for identification and to
prove that they are of "opposite sexes." 9 In Anonymous v. Weinerj° a
New York court refused to issue an order to amend a transsexual's
birth certificate to reflect her sex following genital reconstruction61
surgery. The court reasoned that "an individual born one sex can-
not be changed" by surgically altering the sex organs. The court
accepted the New York Academy of Medicine's arguments against
amending her birth certificate for the following reasons: 1) post-
operative transsexuals retain their pre-operative chromosomal status;
2) transsexuals are psychologically ill and should not be allowed to
use legal documents to conceal their condition; and 3) the public in-
terest in protecting against fraud outweighs transsexuals' private
need for gender identity cohesion.0 Ultimately, the court refused to
recognize her change of sex, relying on the Committee on Public
Health of the New York Academy of Medicine's determination that
she remained "chromosomally" male, even if she is "ostensibly" fe-
58. Only 16 states and the District of Columbia currently allow birth certificates to be
amended with proof of sex reassignment surgery: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
326(A)(4) (1993); Arkansas, ARI. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(f) (Michie 1991); California, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10475 (West 1991); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-217(d)
(1989); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (1991); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 338-
17.7(a) (4) (B) (Supp. 1994); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62(A) (West 1993); Massachu-
setts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46 § 13 (West Supp. 1994); Michigan, MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2831(c) (West 1992); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (1993); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (1994); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (1992);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 432.290(5) (1993); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11 (1989 & Supp.
1995); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (1992). New York is representative of states
holding that a new sex after surgery should not be recorded on a birth certificate because to do
so would fraudulently conceal one's identity. See Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (declaring that the
"public interest for protection against fraud" outweighs the transsexual's desire to be known as a
different sex than the one he or she had at birth).
59. Se, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 300 (West 1994) (stating that "marriage is a personal
relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman. . ."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.01 (West 1996) (providing that "two individuals of the same sex may not validly apply for a
marriage license" (Op. Atty. Gen., 076-31, Feb. 6, 1976)); GA. CODE ANN. 19-3-30(b) (1) (1996)
(mandating that "no marriage license shall be issued to persons of the same sex").
Among the rejected same-sex challenges to marriage statutes are: DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476
A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995);
Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). In Indiana, a circuitjudge refused to
issue a marriage license to two gay prisoners and fined them $2,800 simply for making the re-
quest, and complained, "[t]heir claims about Indiana law and constitutional rights are wacky
and sanctionably so." Arthur Leonard, Judge Denies Marriage License to Gay Male Prisoners, 1988
LESBIAN/GAYL. NOTEs 63.
60. 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
61. Id. at 324.
62. Id. at 321 (citation omitted).
63. Id.
male.64
On the other hand, in In re Anonymous, 5 the court allowed a trans-
sexual to alter her birth certificate on a different, but narrow prem-
ise. 6 The court rejected a chromosomal test as determinative of the
sex of the petitioner, stating that "were it not for the fact that the pe-
titioner's background was known to the court, the court would have
found it impossible to distinguish this person from any other fe-
male."67 Although the court held that after surgery the petitioner• • 68
was both anatomically and psychologically female, it qualified the
decision, stating that "[a]bsent surgical intervention, there is no
question that his social sex must conform with his anatomical sex,
his mental attitude notwithstanding."69 In other words, the law in-
terprets transsexual reality, and therefore, all sexuality, to mean
that sex determines gender, but gender does not determine sex.
Transsexuality challenges this patriarchal resistance to recognizing
that gender does not automatically follow sex. The legal system, in
turn, ignores or erases transsexual realities in order to eliminate sex-
based classification anxiety. 71
Legal, patriarchal resistance to transsexuals' reality does not end
with birth certificates. Suppose an individual has sex reassignment
surgery, as did the individual in the case of In re Anonymous, and is
permitted to amend her birth certificate. If that individual chooses
to get married, can she do so legally?
B. Marriage
Once a transsexual obtains a marriage license, usually with a valid
birth certificate, the act of getting married is generally not difficult.
64. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322; cf. Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99,
102 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (denying a transsexual's request that the designated sex, male, on her birth
certificate be changed to female, despite noting that the "legal nature of sex" cannot be deter-
mined by chromosomes alone).
65. 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
66. Id. at 838.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 837.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 14 (explaining the meaning behind "transsexual reality").
71. Pearlman, supra note 8, at 848. Pearlman argues that if:
[t]he assumption is that there are two and only two genders because gender follows
from 'sex,' then a process of transgression or sex reassignment breaks down the binary
categorization inherent in the sex/gender system and thus raises the level of categori-
zation anxiety. To reduce the anxiety, society pressures masculine females and femi-
nine males to match their biological sex with their gender identity representation
through sex based behaviors and forced internalized gender recognition.... So, if you
are a man, you must perform as a man - thus masculine.
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Even when litigators and judges interfere with weddings involving a
transsexual partner, the marriage may still go forward. In a recent
Texas case, a judge allowed a marriage between "two people with a
vagina, because one of them insisted he was a he, albeit with a very
small penis."72 Notably, though, attorneys suggested one of the two
partners should take on a female persona and claim to have a hyper-
tropic clitoris, ectopic ovaries and vaginal agenesis, to appear more
like a heterosexual couple.7 3 The combined effect of the judge's and
the attorneys' interpretation of this relationship thus enforces the
one-penis-per-union rule while simultaneously denying the true sex-
ual identities of the individuals.7 4 The decision turned on the exis-
tence of a penis and significantly overlooked the gender identities of
the transsexual partners.
In M.T. v. JT.,75 the court began by announcing as natural and
fundamental, the premise that "lawful marriage requires perform-
ance of ceremonial marriage of two persons of the opposite sex, a
male and female."76 Rejecting the idea that sex at birth is the single
most important factor in determining whether one is male or fe-7
male, the court held that a marriage between a man and a male to
female transsexual was valid only in the sense that "if the anatomical
features of a transsexual are made to conform to the person's gender
identity... then identity by sex must be governed by the congruence
of these standards."78 Again, in law, sex determines gender, but gen-S 79
der does not determine sex. Moreover, commentators agree that
Id. at 847 (footnotes omitted). See Note, supra note 9, at 1977 (explaining that "gender does
not follow inevitably merely from being a man or woman").
72. ROTI-mATr, supra note 12, at 80. Rothblatt compares this case to that of Marie/Main
in France in 1601. Ajudge sentenced Marie to die for committing acts of lesbianism with an-
other woman, until a doctor saved her life by testifying that he had examined her and described
her clitoris as a very small penis. Id.
73. These terms refer to an enlarged clitoris, misplaced ovaries, and an unopened vagina.
74. This male-defined phallocentric logic underscores the fact that "[p]enetration is the
most significant cultural feature of the penis." Pearlman, supra note 8, at 849 n.59. In many
respects, the Marie/Marin case is remarkable, given that "[a]n inadequately sized penis is un-
able to penetrate and thus engage in heterosexual intercourse. This inability is at the heart of
an anxiety filled gender classification." Id.
75. 355 A.2d 204 (NJ. Super. 1976).
76. Id.
77. M.T. was the first united states case to reject the Corbett test based primarily on chromo-
somal analysis. Id. at 208.
78. Id. at 209.
79. For example, if one's anatomical appearance, genitalia and/or sex, is a tangible indica-
tion of one's self-identified gender, the court will recognize that gender. If, however, the indi-
vidual does not possess anatomy congruent with that gender identity, the court will consider the
individual's genitalia, not gender identity, in categorizing one as male or female. For the class-
based implications inherent in this reasoning, see Part V.B.
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this decision was not necessarily the positive legal recognition it ap-
peared to be, 80 as the following sections will reveal.
C. Divorce
In general, the greatest scrutiny of marriages involving transsexu-
als occurs when the couple decides to separate, rather than when
they decide to unite. M.T.'s case involved a divorce in which the ex-
husband tried to avoid alimony and support payments by arguing
that his ex-wife, a post-operative male to female transsexual was for-
812merly a man, so the marriage itself was void . The court ruled in the
ex-wife's favor, but based its decision on a rigid bipolar framework.3
It held the marriage to be valid because the transsexual partner had
a vagina; thus the couple could have sexual intercourse. 4  Placing
the wife in such a rigid sex and gender role is not a positive decision
and "in no way does the court's decision undermine the polarized
conception of gender that underlies our marriage laws."85
The remaining, far less "positive" decisions refuse to even grant di-
816vorces in transsexual marriages. For instance, in Frances B. v. Mark
B.,87 a wife sought to annul her marriage to a post-operative female to
male transsexual on the grounds that they were both women and
thus physically incapable of entering into marriage.t The court held
that the couple could not be divorced because their marriage was
80. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Quees, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstnrctingthe Conflation of
'Sex," "Gender, "and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 131-
35 (1995); ROTHBLATT, supra note 12, at 63-4.
81. SeM.T. v.J.T., 355 A. 2d at 204 (N.J. Super. 1976).
82. Id. at 209.
83. Id. at 210-211.
84. See supra note 74 (reporting that penetration is the single most important cultural func-
tion of the penis). Here, the court stated that an important factor in the decision was that M.T.
had undergone successful surgery (to construct a vagina) prior to the marriage which then en-
abled the couple to have intercourse. Therefore, because M.T. was capable of "performing
sexually as a wife" she could be "classified as a woman for the purposes of marriage." M.T., 355
A.2d at 205-06.
85. Colker, supra note 41, at 49.
86. Courts have not treated transsexual marriages and families the same in every case. See,
e.g., Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985) (ordering a female to male trans-
sexual, Michael T., married to Karin T., to pay child support for a child born to the couple
through artificial insemination); Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973)
(granting custody to a female to male transsexual mother who married a woman); ef. In re La-
drach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio P. Ct. 1987) (refusing to grant a marriage license to a post-
operative male to female transsexual and a man); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499
(Sup. Ct. 1971) (declaring null and void the marriage of a pre-operative male to female trans-
sexual to a man).
87. 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974).
88. Id. at 713. The decision noted that the wife argued that her husband did "not have
male sexual organs, (did) not possess a normal penis, and in fact (did) not have a penis." Id.
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never valid.8 9 Because the husband had no congenital male sex or-
gans,9 the marriage itself never existed.9' The record is unclear as to
whether the husband had not undergone sex reassignment surgery,
or if the attempted reconstruction was unsuccessful. Nonetheless,
the court reasoned that because he "does not possess a normal penis,
and in fact does not have a penis," he can not function sexually as a
male in the marriage, therefore the marriage does not exist under
law.9 Clearly the couple was missing the one penis that would have
validated their marriage - without it, their marriage and their rela-
tionship were legally impossible.
The underlying theme is that in order to have a legally recogniz-
able union, a couple must have a legitimate penis and the ability to
have heterosexual intercourse with that penis.5 Yet, the courts do
not stop at these two factors. Procreation draws an arbitrary, hetero-
patriarchal distinction between couples who can marry and those
who cannot.
D. Procreation
I have discussed how courts define sex by reference to external
genitalia. Some courts limit their inquiry to genitalia at birth while
others consider changes in genitalia. These arbitrary distinctions are
especially obvious when courts assert that marriage exists only for
heterosexual sex and procreation.
1. Sexual Intercourse
When courts attempt to apply existing laws to transsexual mar-
riages, the analysis tends to turn on, predictably, factual impossibili-
ties: copulation and procreation. Even in MT., one need only pe-
89. Id. at 717.
90. I use the term "congenital" to refer to an individual's sex at birth.
91. Id. See Valdes, supra note 80, at 134 n.365 (asserting that "the overall prominence of
the husband's penis in the analysis illustrates again how sex as a legal concept depends inevita-
bly and inexorably on external genitalia").
92. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717. In dicta the court scoffed, "the record does not show
that the entrapped male successfully escaped to enable defendant to perform male functions in
a marriage. Attempted sex reassignment ... has not achieved that result." Id. Under this ab-
surd rationale (the only "male functions" in a marriage are penile penetration of a partner's va-
gina), even if the husband could strap on a dildo when plastic surgery failed to properly con-
struct an inflatable penis, the court would not consider either apparatus acceptable. A female
to male transsexual cannot possibly consummate a marriage in the sense required by this court,
and thus can never marry under the one-penis-per-union rule.
93. That is, no strap-on dildos or surgically constructed organs qualify. See MarcelIe Cook-
Daniels, Crossing Over A Lesbian Family's Stoy, in IN THE FAMILY, Oct. 1995, at 9 (commenting on
her post-operative identity, Cook-Daniels notes, "I think of myself as a 'transsexual' male. I
modify the word 'male' because I'm after-market, not factory equipped."). See also supra note 53
(asserting that gender assignment is based on genitals and male phallocentricity).
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ruse a few lines of the court's dicta to discover that the court also be-
lieves that the individual's capacity, both physically and psychologi-
cally, to engage in sexual intercourse must be scrutinized. Again, a
transsexual relationship is recognizable by law only in heteropatriar-
chal terms.
Under the physical element of the court's qualifier, the one-penis-
per-union rule effectively limits transsexuals' marital recognition to
relationships involving a congenital male and a male to female trans-
sexual. After all, female to male transsexuals may not have successful
surgery to attach a penis; it is much easier to invert a penis in order
to replicate a vagina.95 A congenital female and a post-operative
male to female transsexual couple would fail the intercourse re-
quirement as well, since both would have vaginas. Without a penis,
intercourse in its traditional, heteropatriarchal conception is impos-
sible.96 As a result, classification based on male anatomy remains the
status quo and classification by female anatomy is overlooked and
erased. That is, phallocentric patriarchal domination is neatly main-
tained.
As for the court's psychological element in the sexual intercourse
requirement, one is left to her imagination.
94. M.T., 355 A.2d at 209.
95. For a detailed description of both surgical processes, see BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at
16. The penis, for female to male transsexuals, is, according to Bornstein, a rolled up skin graft
which is virtually nonfunctional, even for urinary purposes. With technological breakthroughs,
however, these surgeries are yielding increasingly functional results. Id.
96. For an analysis of the absurdity of applying one definition of "sex" to all sexual orienta-
tions, see MARILYN FRYE, WILLFUL VIRGIN 134 (1992). Frye reviews a study suggesting that lesbi-
ans "have sex" less often than gay male couples and heterosexual couples and asserts that spe-
cific words do not exist to articulate women's intimate experiences. She explores the
patriarchal origins of words like "sex," "sexual," and "sexuality" which women adopted for them-
selves to counter the "stifling woman-hating Victorian denial that women even have bodily
awareness, arousal, excitement, orgasms and so on." Id. at 116. Frye concludes that "having sex"
is a phallocentric concept pertaining to "heterosexual intercourse, in fact, primarily to hetero-
sexist intercourse, that is, male-dominant-female-subordinate-copulation-whose-completion-and-
purpose-is-the-male's-ejaculation." Id. at 113. The primary limitation in attempting to articulate
our experiences through male-defined terms is that:
Our [lesbian] lives, the character of our embodiment, cannot be mapped back on to
that semantic center. When we try to synthesize and articulate it by the rules of that
mapping, we end up trying to mold our loving and passionate carnal intercourse into
explosive 8-minute events. But that is the timing and the ontology of an alienated and
patriarchal [male] penis, not of the lesbian body. When the only thing that counts as
"doing it" are those passages of our interactions which most closely approximate a
paradigm that arose from the meanings of the rising and falling penis, no wonder we
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2. Transsexual Procreation
In Frances B., the court held that a union involving a congenital
female and a post-operative female to male transsexual was not a
valid marriage. In addition to its preoccupation with the role of
male genitalia in marriage, the court reasoned that "the marriage re-
lationship exists with the result and for the purpose of begetting off-
spring."9F Therefore, because the "husband" did not have the
"necessary apparatus" to be male, theirs could not be a valid mar-
riage.9 From this reasoning, one can conclude that if a male to fe-
male transsexual were to marry a male, the marriage would likewise
be invalid because he would not have the "necessary apparatus" to be
female and bear offspring.Ios His relationship as a post-operative
transsexual is rendered a legal impossibility when defined in terms of
an ability to procreate.
With the above legal interpretations in mind, I return to Born-
stein's situation.'01 Recall that Kate Bornstein, a male to female
transsexual is in a relationship with David Harrison, a female to male
transsexual. She could probably change her birth certificate, as
97. 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
98. Id. This reasoning may seem illogical, as it should, given that heterosexuals who are
physically unable to procreate can nonetheless marry.
99. Id. A look at the selective enforcement of gender-neutral anti-sodomy statutes, how-
ever, suggests that facially neutral proscriptions are not necessarily applied equally to hetero-
sexuals and homosexuals. Sep, e.g., Moseley v. Esposito, No. 89-6897-1 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 6,
1989) (insisting that heterosexuals have every right to engage in sodomy within the institution
of marriage); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender. A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY
9, 10 n.2 (1991) (commenting that "a fascinating legal anomaly would result if a state relied on
Hardwick [declaring homosexuals have no constitutional right to engage in sodomy] to prose-
cute a married lesbian or gay couple").
100. SeeValdes, supra note 80, at 134 n.365. The role of the vagina in marriage is a signifi-
cant issue in and of itself in transsexual unions. If penetration is considered the most important
cultural function of the penis (and males, by default), then "for the female.., the only concern
for the capacity of the vagina is its ability to be penetrated by a penis." Pearlman, supra note 8,
at 849 n.59. This sentiment is modified, however, in judge Ormrod's reasoning in the landmark
Corbett decision, positing that because penile penetration of an artificial vagina is more like anal
intercourse than sexual intercourse, marriage between a man and a male to female transsexual
cannot be consummated and thus cannot exist. Corbett (orse Ashley) at 107.
Consummation, the act of legitimating a marriage, is more a religious edict than a legal pre-
scription. In Catholicism, for example, a marriage is only considered "legal" after it is
'consummated by sexual intercourse." SeejIM HILL & RAND CHEADLE, THE BIBLE TELLS ME So
88 (1996). That we frequently presume consunmmation is a civil requirement for sealing the
marriage contract is indicative of the role religion continues to play in contemporary treatment
of this institution. That is not to say, however, that consummation is not legally prescribed. It is
often codified in marriage statutes. Se4 e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 302 (West 1995) (stating that
"an unmarried male or female under the age of 18 years is capable of consenting to and con-
summating marriage" if written consent from the minor's parents and a court order are ob-
mined).
101. Although I base this analysis on accounts in Bornstein's memoir, I do not mean to sug-
gest that Bornstein wants to many (or not marry) Harrison. Her memoir does not discuss this
issue. Looking at their relationship in this context is my own endeavor.
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could Harrison. They could probably get married with little, if any,
legal intervention. If, however, either individual seeks a divorce, or if
their marriage is scrutinized in court, for say, an adoption petition,
their union probably would not be considered valid. Harrison does
not have a congenital penis. Bornstein reconfigured hers. Perhaps a
judge could be convinced of the same Marie/Marin type situation
10 2
as in the Texas case. The point is, however, as Martine Rothblatt as-
serts, such "verbal gymnastics" should not be necessary. Most trans-
sexuals cannot confine or define their experiences and relationships
in heteropatriarchal, binary terms. Semantics can do violence. Yet,
the law requires transsexuals to force themselves into prescribed se-
mantic paradigms which, as the next Part explores, may nonetheless
exclude them.
IV. GENITALS AND GENDERS AND FAMILIES - OH MY!1°4
They drove us out, made us feel ashamed of how we looked ...
The plants closed. Something we never could have imagined.
That's when I began passing as a man. Strange to be exiled from
your own sex to borders that will never be home. You were ban-
ished too, to another land with your own sex, and yet forcibly apart
from the women you loved...
105
- Leslie Feinberg, Stone Butch Blues
Oh now attitude, why even bother?
I can't change your mind;
You can't change my color.
Free your mind and the rest will follow.
-En Vogue, Free Your Mina10
Categories can be comfortable in terms of group identity, or they
can be used to exclude and oppress, depending on who has drawn
the lines and for what purpose. Being (100%) white, declared the
Supreme Court in P/essy, was a proper prerequisite to separate, in-
102. See supra note 72 (explaining the 1601 French case of two lesbians who married each
other).
103. ROTHBLATr, supra note 12, at 80.
104. This phrase is adapted from a popular line in the Wizard of Oz, in which Dorothy, hand-
in-hand with her misfit friends, walks warily through a forest, chanting "lions and tigers and
bears - oh myl" The Wizard of Oz, MGM(1939).
105. LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES 11 (1993).
106. ENVOGUE, Free YourMind, on FUNKY DIVAS (Eastwest Records 1992).
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deed preferred, treatment based on race. °7 Anyone classified as
black under these white supremacist laws would be treated differ-
ently. At the heart of Plessy's case was a challenge to the arbitrariness
of racial assignment. As one attorney argued, "there are great num-
bers of citizens in whom the preponderance of the blood of one race
or another, is impossible of ascertainment, except by careful scrutiny
of the pedigree." 8 In fact, seventeen different genes combine and
interact on a continuum to create skin tone or pigmentation.'09 Yet,
the Court in Pessy heralded arbitrary distinctions drawn to impose
separate treatment with respect to race.
Similar to law's binary construction of race, our legal system views
the sexuality of individuals in terms of rigid bipolar and arbitrary
classification schemes based on genitals, rather than on a gender
continuum. n0 Incongruity between sex and gender poses "a chal-
lenge not only to assigning categories, but to the corresponding de-
sire to regulate and limit 'confusion.'""' Hermaphrodites, for ex-
ample, commonly undergo surgery in infancy to "correct" their
"problem" and assign their genital sex as either male or female, but
not both.11 On the other hand, when transsexuals decide, in adult-
hood, to undergo an operation to alter their genital sex, we strive to
classify them as either male or female based on their genitals. The
legal system, as we have seen, rigidly assigns a sex, not a gender, to
transsexuals on the basis of their genitals either before or after their
107. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
108. Colker, supra note 41, at 7. In terms of race and sex based categories, Judy Scales Trent
relates that "people feel uncomfortable when [she tries] to explain to them that [she is] a
'white black woman,' because categories 'make the world appear understandable and safe.'" Id.
at 14 (citingJudy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the Same, 2
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 305, 305 (1990)).
109. See generally Mei Guo &James A. Birchler, Trans-acting Dosage Effects on the Expression of
Model Gene Systems in Maize Aneuploids, SCIENCE, Dec. 23, 1994, at 1999. Along these lines, civil
rights activist Mary Church Terrell rejected use of the word "Negro." She asserted that "[t)he
word is a misnomer from every point of view. It does not represent a country or anything else
except one single, solitary color.. .. We are the only human beings in the world with 57 variety
of complexions who are classed together as a single racial unit." THE BLACK WOMAN'S GUMBO
YA-YA 98 (Terri L. Jewell, ed. 1993) [hereinafter GUMBO YA-YA] (quoting Mary Church Terrell,
who founded the National Association of Colored Women in 1896).
110. See, e.g., ROTIIBLArT, supra note 12, at ix (noting that she recalls only one person of
color from her childhood, which made it easy for her community to draw distinctions based on
skin tone: "there were two races, black and white." Moreover, "[s]ince everyone was also di-
vided into boys and girls, husbands and wives, it also seemed obvious that there were two sexes,
male and female." Id.)
111. Pearlman, supra note 8, at 845 (citation omitted).
112. Pearlman notes that "(s]urgery is not performed 'because it is threatening to the in-
fant's life,' but because it is threatening to the infant's culture." Pearlman, supra note 8, at 850
(quoting Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender. Case Management of Intersexed In-
fants, 16 SIGNS 3, 25 (1990) (defining intersexed infants as "babies born with genitals that are
neither dearly male nor dearly female")).
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reassignment surgery - whichever classification is least threatening
to the patriarchy. 3
I explored the legal interpretations of transsexual marriages to il-
lustrate how transsexuality threatens patriarchy in terms of tradi-
tional notions of family. Our perceptions of family are frequently
tied to sexual relations, for example, spouses, lovers, same-sex part-
ners. Sexuality, then, is central to our understanding of family, a
concept Martha Fineman calls the "sexual family." 14 That we view
families across sexual lines rather than intergenerational lines, such
as the mother-child dyad, is no accident; it is perpetuated by and
serves the patriarchy. Fineman explains,
It is the ideological power of patriarchy that explains why an indi-
vidual can resist or reject its structures by, for example, refusing to
participate in a nuclear family but still find herself defined and ul-
timately controlled by the ideology underlying and supporting the
structure.' 5
In patriarchy it is difficult to examine alternative family structures,
like defining the mother-child dyad as the core family unit, because
we view men's most significant role in the family as a sexual affilia-• • 116 ..
tion with women. We often overlook male biological roles within• 117
the family as, for example, sons, brothers, and uncles. Women and
men alike may resist alternative family roles because "if patriarchy is a
shared construct, it affects us all. Its core images of intimacy and
sexuality define the discourses produced by both the proponent of
the status quo and its critic."" 8 Nevertheless, we need to rethink the
concept of "family" and how we define the roles within that concept.
Because the sexual construction of family is a tool of the patriar-
chy, it exists without question. That is, the patriarchal family is an
"assumed institution," socially defined and constructed to require
seemingly "complementary roles, husband/head of household,
wife/helpmate and child."' 9 From these roles we conclude that the
most significant tie in the family is borne of sexual affiliation, a le-
113. Transsexuality "is threatening because it gives a human dimension to the unrecognized
ground between the rules of a binary structure." Pearlman, supra note 8, at 845.
114. MARTuA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURYTRAGEDIES (1995).
115. Id. at 23.
116. See id at 5 (refuting the claim that choosing a mother-child dyad as the core family unit
is "sexist" and suggesting we look at intimacy between women and men as a vertical, intergen-
erational tie, rather than merely a horizontal one).
117. Id.
118. Id at 24 (emphasis in original).
119. FINEMAN, supra note 114, at 24.
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gally sanctioned marital bond."O Thus, our assumption that sexual
affiliation forms the basis of the family "reinforces patriarchy in that
it defines the male presence as essential and dominant within thefamily.,121
The underlying assumption of the "sexual family," therefore, sup-
ports the rigid sexual distinctions propounded by courts faced with
transsexual marriages. The patriarchal construct of family requires
presence of a male. A family without a male threatens the overall
scheme of male domination because control within the household is
perhaps the most elemental level of male supremacy. 123 As a result,
the patriarchal legal system constructs rigid gender-genital categories
and distinctions to maintain the sexual family by controlling who
may marry. This goal is achieved in two ways: the one-penis-per-
union rule and recognition of genitals over gender.
A. Marriage and the Many Ways We Cannot Be
An underlying theme in the cases above is that courts are not will-
ing to accept different definitions of the sexual family. Given the le-
gal interpretations of transsexual marriages, the sexual family is a
120. Underlying these roles is the assumption that men hold a dominant position over
women in the family. The ideal, biblically-defined marriage mandates submission of women to
men in marriage. See, e.g., Ephesians 5:22-26. "Wives submit yourselves unto your husbands, as
unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife." Id. at 5:22-23. As for secular traditions
in marriage, the male-as-head-of-household standard also persists. Even though most states have
sex-neutral statutes regarding domicile, surnames and head of household designations, "old
practices concerning domicile and names and family decision-making continue to exist... Cus-
tom still dictates that women change their names at marriage and that children born in wedlock
be given the surnames of their fathers." SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE,
AND THEORY 1186 (Barbara Allen Babcock et al eds., 2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SEX DIS.
CRIMINATION AND THE LAW].
121. FINEMAN, supra note 114, at 23.
122. Included in this patriarchal construct is racism. Many communities of color do not ad-
here to the traditional, white, middle class model of a nuclear family. Instead, grandparents,
aunts, uncles and other relatives may comprise a "nuclear" family not recognized under law. See
Taitz, supra note 25, at 56; C. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY45-61 (1974). See gmerallyVALERIEPOLAKOW, LIVES ON THE EDGE: SINGLE MOTHERS
AND THEIR CHILDREN IN THE OTHERAMERICA (1993).
123. Scholars debate why sex role inequality persists in marriage even though family law is
now gender-neutral, sex-discrimination in the labor market is decreasing, and most married
women work and earn wages outside the home. Most marriages today are not egalitarian. See
generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOS.
TALGIATRAP 122-48 (1995). One suggested response to this phenomenon is to accept "the con-
tinuation of male dominance and sex-based roles in marriage [as an] ... inevitable consequence
of permitting people to make their own choices." SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, supra note
120, at 1188.
For an insightful analysis of the origins of male domination in the household, see BOB
MCCUBBIN, THE ROOTS OF LESBIAN AND GAY OPPRESSION 17-22 (1993) (explaining how sexual
slavery lead to subjugation of women and the advent of the "male-dominated monogamous fam-
ily").
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concept of polarity. While most transsexuals perceive themselves as
existing on a continuum of sexuality, not specifically "male" nor spe-
cifically "female," courts are unwilling to look beyond a person's
genitals to determine sexual affiliation. 124 The fluidity of a sexual
continuum threatens patriarchy because it challenges the assumed,
rigid need for a male presence in marriage. Hence, the one-penis-
per-union rule.
While vigilantly protecting the boundaries of marriage, judges and
• . 125
legislators tell us with whom we can have sex and marry. For exam-
ple, the court in M.T. drew distinct gender poles to justify recogni-
126tion of a transsexual marriage. If, between two individuals, there
exists just one penis and one vagina, constructed or original, and
those two individuals can then have sex as would occur between a
man and a woman, the law will recognize their ability to be married.
The concept of the sexual family, therefore, is not threatened be-
cause the presence of a man (penis), not the transsexuality of the
woman, is the basis for recognition.
Alternatively, the legal system tells us with whom we can not have
sex or marry. In vonHofflurg v. Alexander, for example, the Fifth
Circuit defined Marie vonHoffburg as a lesbian after the military re-
fused to acknowledge the post-operative genital re/construction of
her husband, even though the couple married after the surgery.128
The court noted that "although Kristian vonHoffburg is a psycho-
logical female to male transsexual, Kristian is a biological female." 129
As a result, the army discharged Marie, despite her own self-identity
as heterosexual, for being a lesbian. A lesbian married to a man?
131
The penalties for violating the one-penis-per-unioi rule can be rigid
124. According to Martine Rothblatt, "Manhood and womanhood can be life-style choices
open to anyone, regardless of genitala. It is law and custom, not biology, that makes birth or-
der, birth parents, skin tone, or genitals relevant to one's ability to choose a culture, perform a
job, or adopt a life-style." ROTHBLATr, supra note 12, at 3.
125. For example, as recently as 1967, a Virginia statute prohibited a white citizen from mar-
rying a non-white citizen. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court, however,
unanimously struck down the law, stating that such a statute had no legitimate purpose and in
effect attempted to promote white supremacy. Id. at 396.
126. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
127. 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 636.
130. With this query, I turn again to the relationship between Bornstein, a lesbian-identified
male to female transsexual, and Harrison, a female to male transsexual (Bornstein's memoir
does not indicate Harrison's sexual orientation). On this issue, Bornstein remarks, "Can you
imagine? I wake up one morning, a nice lesbian like me, I wake up one morning and I'm living
with a a man! [So] ... with a man as my lover, what was I?" BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 237.
One is left to wonder whether her self-identification would coincide with how the law would
classify her.
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and cruel.
Ultimately, how we have sex may impact our potential to be legally
married. Sodomy and other socio-legally constructed crimes against
nature aside, the situation of hermaphrodites is particularly relevant.
Although In re Marriage of C. and D.'3' is an Australian case, the
court's reasoning parallels that of the united states' courts discussed
above. In C. and D., the respondent had not been diagnosed as in-
tersexed until he was twenty-one.' He continued to live as a male
and married a woman shortly thereafter.' Eleven years later, his
wife requested a nullification of their marriage, which the Family
Court of Australia granted on two grounds. 3 4 First, the marriage was
not consensual because the wife was mistaken as to her husband's
1135
identity at the time of their marriage.13 Apparently, it took the wife
eleven years to discover her husband had a penis and a vagina.1
Second, the court defined marriage as a union between a man and a
woman; since the respondent was anatomically both, the marriage
was invalid. 37 Although outside the standard one-penis-per-union
rule, this reasoning serves its purpose. If the court allowed her-
maphrodites to marry, the genital boundaries that define marriage
and the legitimate sexual family would become blurred. There can
be no genital continuum with hermaphrodites, which could involve
three or four (genital) organs in one union, because just as with
transsexuals, there can be no recognition of a sexual continuum.
Patriarchy mandates the "control of intersexual bodies because they
blur and bridge the great divide ... they have unruly bodies."'3'
B. Matter Over Mind?: When Identity Takes a Backseat to Anatomy
The second underlying theme in the cases above supports the no-
tion that nontraditional relationships, those outside the nuclear fain-
131. 35 F.L.R. 340 (Austl. 1979).
132. Id. The term "intersexed" commonly refers to infants who have genitalia of two sexes,
whereas "hermaphrodite" usually refers to an adult having genitals of two sexes. I use both
terms interchangeably without attaching special significance to the age of an individual having
multiple genitals.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 344. In dicta the court found it noteworthy that the respondent had not been
able to properly consummate the marriage. Id. at 341.
135. Id. at 345.
136. The wife argued that she had never had sexual intercourse with her husband. Id. at
342.
137. Thejudge opined that the wife "did not in fact marry a male but a combination of both
male and female and notwithstanding that the husband exhibited as a male, he was not." Id. at
345.
138. Colker, supra note 41, at 51-52 (citation omitted).
366 [Vol. 5:343
IMPOSSIBLE EXISTENCE
ily, shall be legally defined in terms of sex rather than gender. With
the exception of MT., a male to female transsexual who walks, talks
and looks like a woman (even under her clothes), and lives as a
woman, is classified only as "ostensibly" female.8 9 Regardless of how
transsexuals perceive themselves and their own gender, the law falls
to consider individualized gender identities. M.T.'s only saving grace
was that her husband had a functional penis.14
Martine Rothblatt offers two commonly cited (non)answers as to
why courts insist on placing such a high value on sexual identity
while devaluing gender identity in transsexual relationships: relig-
ious orthodoxy condemned cogenital relationships as sinful, and re-
ligious leaders convinced legislators that co-genital relationships
141
would lead to the end of the species.
The first reason is simply inaccurate, and at best, outdated. Sev-
eral religious organizations and leaders in the united states have
formally, publicly argued against proscribing co-genital relationships,
the issue of morality notwithstanding. For example, the Unitarian
Universalist Association argues "that 'private consensual behavior be-
tween persons over the age of consent shall be the business of those
persons and not subject to legal regulations.'1 4  The General As-
semblies of the Presbyterian Church (USA) assert that "religious
convictions held by individuals should not be imposed by law on the
secular society."43  Even within the Catholic Church, a bastion of
homosexual intolerance, at least one group of priests have declared
"opposition to all civil laws which make consensual homosexual acts
between adults a crime and thus urge [ I their repeal."'" Further-
more, several Protestant denominations in the U.S., including many
Quaker congregations and the Unitarian Universalist Church, rec-
oguize same-sex unions.145 Therefore, with respect to transsexuality,
139. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
140. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
141. ROTHBLATT, supra note 12, at 64.
142. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 95 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 2d ed. 1997) (citing
Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae American Friends Service Committee, et al., at 15-25, State v.
Baxley, 656 So.2d 973 (La. 1995)). Other religious organizations voicing similar opinions in-
clude the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the
Lutheran Church in America, the Reformed Church in America, the Disciples of Christ, and the
American Jewish Congress. Id. at 95-99. Notably, however, each of these organizations want to
remove secular proscriptions on homosexuality, but simultaneously advocate moral condemna-
tion of cogenital relationships. See id.
143. Id. at 95 (quoting Minutes of the General Assembly (1970)).
144. Id. at 97 (quoting the National Federation of Priests Councils).
145. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW 418 (William Rubenstein ed., 1993). Rubenstein
further suggests that strong evidence exists to show that "the Catholic Church consecrated
same-sex marriages from the fifth through at least the thirteenth century." Id. But cf.
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one commentator has urged that "the simplistic biblical dichotomy
between the sexes may now, in the light of modem insights, have to
give way to a bipolar model of human sexuality." 6
The second reason, the tired, overstated case for procreation as a
bar to nontraditional marriages, should be put to rest altogether.
Like transsexuals, some lesbian and gay camps have long sought
state approval and recognition of their relationships in legal mar-
riage. These attempts thus far have proven futile for reasons akin
to those propounded in the transsexual marriage and divorce
cases. 48 A common justification for refusing to legally recognize
these relationships is that "marriage exists as a protected legal insti-
tution primarily because of societal values associated with propaga-
tion of the human race, and it is apparent that no same-sex couple
offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union. 149  Al-
though medical technology, and even naturally occurring ectopic
pregnancies, inform us that a vagina and uterus are not necessary to
carry a fetus to term, in a female or a male, courts refuse to sanc-
tion same-sex marriages, suggesting that partners with similar repro-
ductive tracts are disqualified from marriage. Yet, courts do not bar
heterosexual couples from marriage if they cannot physically procre-
MCCUBBIN, supra note 123, at 30 (suggesting that the Medieval Church, in cooperation with the
feudal ruling class, "raised the persecution of homosexuals to a hysterical [sic) pitch that has set
the tone for Western attitudes and practice ever since").
146. Henry Finlay, Legal Recognition of Transsexuals in Australia, 12J. CONTEMP. H.L. & POLY
503,517 (1996).
147. For the touchstone articles in the same-sex marriage debate among lesbian and gay ac-
tivists, see Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK NAT'L GAY &
LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 20; and Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Have the Right to
Many, OUT/LOOK GAY& LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, at 10. See also Symposium, Debating the Fight for
Same-SexManiage, GAYCOMMUNrIYNEIVS, Winter-Spring 1996, at 4 (including Cathy Cohen, The
Price of Inclusion in the Marriage Club, at 27; Letitia Gomez, Marriage Latino Style, at 5; Nancy D.
Polikoff, Marriage as a Choice? Since When?, at 26).
148. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 984, 352 N.Y.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct.
1971) (holding that marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman);
Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247,253-55,522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (1974) (finding that same-sex
marriages are not included within the proper definition of marriage).
149. See Singerv. Hara, 522 P.2d 1195 (1974)).
150. Ectopic pregnancies, usually fatal when the embryo attaches to the fallopian tubes, can
and have resulted in live, healthy births. In these cases, rather than the egg moving from the
ovary into the fallopian tube, it may float into the abdominal cavity. Sperm can travel the length
of the female reproductive tract, exit the fallopian tubes, and fertilize the egg. If fertilized, the
resulting zygote can implant in the outer wall of the uterus or attach to the small intestine, ab-
sorbing nutrients from the mother's blood. In a couple of months, the fetus will have formed
its own placenta, and is born via cesarean section. This procedure has been performed success-
fully in primates, but the medical field is simply not exposing the procedure to the general pub-
lic. The potential for anyone, male, homosexual, or transsexual, to attach an in vitro fertilized
egg to the small intestine and bear offspring is thus a reality. See Laurel Galana, Radical Rero-
duction: X Without Y, in THE LESBIAN READER 122 (Amazon Press ed. 1989).
ate, nor is this inability grounds for divorce .' Arguably, if under-
population were a compelling governmental concern, the state
would deny marriage licenses to heterosexuals who cannot procreate
as readily as they deny licenses to lesbian and gay couples. In fact, if
procreation were the only justification for such denial, states "would
allow sterile or menopausal lesbians and sterile [gay] men to enter
same-sex marriages."
Religious resistance and arguments about procreation are flawed
from a legal perspective. Neither position adequately explains why
one single definition of family, or even gender, is correct.15 3  The
bottom line is that patriarchy cannot afford to recognize gender as a
fluid concept, capable of change, and ever-changing. The seemingly
complementary roles of husband/mother/child that exist, unques-
tioned within the sexual family, persist because each role holds its
distinct place in the hierarchical structure of the family. 54 We cate-
gorize accordingly. The father has a penis, the mother a vagina.
Clear, concise and easy. To accept that gender, or one's own gender
identity, may not conform with her or his genitals threatens these
rigid boundaries.
Limiting legal inquiry to one's genitals is arbitrary, since we know
that transsexuals can alter their genitals. Such an inquiry is also eas-
ily manipulated by judges using anatomy as tool to measure trans-
sexuals against their partners. That is, beyond measuring one indi-
vidual's genital structure, a couple with the combined anatomical
capacity to have heterosexual intercourse can be ascertained in court
and have their behavior sanctioned. Such a distinction is wholly ir-
relevant to each individual's gender identity. If sex determines gen-
der, why doesn't gender determine sex? The capacity to have het-
erosexual intercourse determines who can marry. Gender identity,
in turn, one's perceived or rejected role within the sexual family,
may pose a legal barrier to marriage.
151. See Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 NYU L. REV. 800,
835 (1986) (rejecting the contention that reproduction is central to marriage).
152. SeeAndrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privay: Abandoning Sciptura4
Canonical and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 HoW. L.J. 173 (1992) (questioning
why states do not have similar procreation-only laws governing heterosexual marriages).
153. Taboos against same-sex relationships are a socially constructed phenomenon. In an-
cient Greece, for example, homosexual and heterosexual relationships were recognized equally
under law. See McCUBBIN, supra note 123, at 21-24. In fact, prior to the sexual subjugation of
women, group marriages were common. Id.
154. SeeWilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProcreationforPersonalifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
563, 572 (1979) (finding that recognition of homosexual marriages would undermine the stabil-
ity of the nuclear family which "has been fortified by a conception of marriage as an exclusively
heterosexual union").
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V. EXPLORATIONS TOWARD A RESOLUTION: MARRIAGE AND PRISONS
COMPARED
some guy designed
these shoes i use to walk around
some big man's business
turns a profit every time
i lay my money down
some guy designed this room
i'm standing in
another one built it
with his own tools
who says i like right angles
these are not my laws
these are not my rules
-Ani DiFranco, i'm no heroine
155
Vain trifles as they seem, clothes have, they say, more important
offices than merely to keep us warm. They change our view of the
world and the world's view of us.
-Virginia Woolf, Orando1 6
There are no hard and fast solutions to deconstructing sexual
apartheid. Understanding the ideology behind the sexual family,
however, in connection with how the socio-legal system confines all
people to rigid bipolar sex and gender roles is a beginning.
A. The Marriage Trap
Fineman suggests that we dismantle the existing concept of the
sexual family which feeds patriarchy, in exchange for recognizing
other, intergenerational bonds. 57 The bond we traditionally per-
ceive as between mother and child should not necessarily be con-
fined to rigid gender definitions. A man may fulfill the same roles
ascribed to the wife/helpmate in the sexual family when he partici-
pates in duties traditionally associated with motherhood, as in caring
for a child or a disabled relative. If we begin to recognize, and even
encourage disruption of the norm, the rigid gender assignments we
155. ANI DIFRANCO, i'm no heroine, on IMPERFECTLY (Righteous Babe Records 1992).
156. VIRGINIAWOOLF, ORLANDO 187 (1928).
157. SeeFINEMAN, supra note 114, at 5.
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hold for each role, husband/wife/child, become fluid and continu-
OuS.
Traditional family roles are dependent upon strict bipolar models
of male and female." 8 Just as patriarchy promulgates polar opposites
in marriage, the husband/wife dyad, the legal system recognizes only
males and females and refuses to see transsexuals, indeed all people,
as existing on a continuum of gender identity. The system punishes
those who do not fit neatly within bipolar categories. For example,
hermaphrodites are forced to have "corrective" surgery in infancy to
eliminate their intersexuality,1 9 and transsexuals are forced into a
legal nonexistence when they have surgery as adults to conform their
sexual genitalia with their perceived gender identity.
Marriage, as a family construct, should not be based on sex,
though the concept of "sex" to which I refer is slightly different from
that which Fineman addresses.'o I agree that marriage, as a concep-
tual scheme, should not occupy the fundamental basis for what we
call "family." But in discussing marriage, sex and gender should not
even be an issue. To go one step further, we could question the
whole concept of couples. Why can't three or five or ten people get
married?161  Marriage exists to maintain male domination over
162
women - a system of ownership. More than two spouses would blur
158. See generally Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegena-
tion Analogy, 25 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 981, 1003 (1991) (asserting that the traditional "nuclear fam-
fly" arrangement is no longer the only model of family life in the united states).
159. See, e.g., BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 57. Bornstein asks, "What if you had been born a
hermaphrodite, with some combination of both genitals?" Id. Western medicine dictates that
"[a] surgeon would have 'fixed' you - without your consent, and possibly without the consent or
even the knowledge of your parents, depending on your race and economic status." Id.
160. For the most part, Fineman looks at sex in terms of sexual affiliations, whereas I have
concentrated largely on sex in terms of genitalia.
161. See supra note 123 (noting that sexual subordination of women gave rise to the male-
dominated model of monogamous marriage and family that exists still today). Perhaps non-
monogamy is not far from mainstream view. In Boulder, Colorado, for example, a group called
"Loving More" actively practices "polyamory," which they define as multiple sexual relationships.
Bill Husted, James EarlJones Trumpets Buell Extravaganza, DENVER POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at A2. In
fact, the group publishes a magazine promoting "polyamory" and boasts 10,000 subscribers. Id.
One member suggested, "Odds are, your monogamous relationship won't last, so why not ac-
knowledge that up front?" Id. These "four-or-more-somes" meet over the Web and hold mar-
riage ceremonies with cakes holding up to six figurines. Id.
162. See MCCUBBIN, supra note 123, at 17-22. In a warning, Black lesbian feminist poet Au-
dre Lorde captured both the perversity of white patriarchal tradition and the repercussions of
black men adopting those ideals:
It is not the destiny of Black america to repeat white america's mistakes. But we will, if
we mistake the trappings of success in a sick society for the signs of a meaningful life.
If Black men continue to define "femininity" instead of their own desires, and to do it
in archaic European terms, they restrict our access to each other's energies. Freedom
and future for Blacks does not mean absorbing the white male disease of sexism.
AuDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 63 (1984).
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the husband-wife, dominant-subordinate bipolar roles that make
marriage so valuable to men.10 Even the thought of two or more
wives per husband is dangerous because wives might realize they can
satisfy each other, apart from their husband.w The one-penis-per-
union standard reinforces this bipolar model.
Insofar as finding a legal paradigm befitting transsexual marriages
is concerned, the issue appears to be more about recognition than
right. In other words, transsexuals with a valid birth certificate gen-
erally marry without incident. In most cases, judges only step in to
deny transsexual identity when the marriage is challenged after-the-
fact.16 As the cases show, even when transsexuals attempt to coordi-
nate their anatomical sex with their gender identity they will not be
recognized in a legal marriage, primarily because crossing genders,
crossing roles, violates the bipolar model of sex - male or female.' 6
163. The Mormon Church was the last established religion in the united states known to
actively practice polygamy, usually one man having several wives. The Church itself abolished
this practice, which non-Mormons named the "Mormonistic ulcer," in 1890. HILL & CHEADLE
supra note 100, at 88.
164. Significantly, although the practice of bigamy and polygamy is federally prohibited,
each may be practiced under the rubric of freedom of religion, as long as all concurrent mar-
riages are with members of the same religion. Brian Hosford, Conveying Respect of Society, THE
IRISH TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, at 21.
Polygamy, the practice of one spouse (usually a man) having many other spouses (wives), is in
fact documented in united states history, and is still practiced by men in parts of this country.
For example, one man had seven different wives across several states in 1996. Rob Howe, Cathy
Free, Lynda Wright, Lorna Grisby & Ellise Pierce, Princess Brides: John Weaver Said All the Right
Things, But When the Law Stepped in, His Many Wives and Loves Realized He Was Mr. Wrong, PEOPLE
MAGAZiNE,July 8, 1996, at 34. See Bigamy Not Protected, Judge Says, FLORIDA TODAY, May 30, 1996,
at 6B (reporting a state circuit judge's ruling against a man who had two wives. Thejudge held
that "bigamy is pernicious to the best interests of society and to the best interests of the institu-
tion of marriage." Id.)
Whether the practice of polygamy is culturally or ethnically enforced has also been a topic of
debate. See, e.g., James W. Clarke, Black-on-Black Violence, SOCIETY, July 17, 1996, at 46
(suggesting that because white law enforcers applied white-constructed proscriptions differently
to black citizens in the early twentieth century, some social mores differ across racial lines to-
day). In the 1930s in Mississippi, for example, if black tenant farmers worked hard enough,
landowners would exempt them from certain laws "that whites considered unimportant because
violating them had little impact on the white community." Id. Thus, proscriptions against po-
lygamy, bigamy, adultery and assaultive behavior were not legally punished, as long as the behav-
ior occurred within the black community. Id. As a result, racial differences may exist today with
respect to the types of behaviors we define as "wrong." See gneraly Asuncion Lavrin, Lives of the
Bigamists: Marriage, Family, and Community in Colonial Mexico, 28 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 510 (1996)
(exploring the historical origins, acceptance, and treatment of bigamy in colonial Latin Amer-
ica).
165. See supra Part III B.-D.; Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(declaring a marriage involving a transsexual null and void); see also In re London, 513 N.E.2d
828 (Ohio Prob. CL 1987) (refusing to grant a marriage license to a postoperative male to fe-
male transsexual and her male partner).
166. See Harper & Clifton, Heterosexuality: A Prerequisite to Marriage in Texas?, 14 S. TEX. LJ.
220, 247 (1972-73) (arguing that what makes marriage "special" is that it can only exist between
heterosexuals).
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Legally speaking, these boundaries cannot be relaxed by surgical al-
teration. Of course, if gay and lesbian marriages become legally
available, these anatomical, gender, and sex categories will no longer
be an issue. Generally, recognition of same-sex marriages may, in
some ways, benefit transsexuals who want to marry because this ex-
ternal pressure to define oneself within a specific sex will be elimi-
nated. The flip side, however, is that such recognition may further
blur our view of how legal standards erase transsexual identity.
When I say transsexual identity is erased or impossible, I refer to
judicial refusal to acknowledge, much less permit, these relation-
ships. Beyond that refusal, however, is a more perverse erasure - a re-
jection of transsexual gender identity. Under our conventional un-
derstanding of sexual orientation, the relationship between M.T. and
J.T., for example, would have been classified as homosexual prior to
M.T.'s sex reassignment surgery, even though J.T. identified as het-
erosexual. After the surgery, the court deemed the same on-going
relationship as heterosexual, not because they identified as hetero-,68
sexual, (M.T. still identified as homosexual), but because M.T.'s
operation altered the genital configuration of the couple from co-
genital to cross-genital. The decision recognized their heterosexual
sexual capacity, not their gender identities. If the M.T. court, other
courts, and the legal system in general accepted one's own chosen
and asserted gender identity, rather than looking down the pants of
every couple seeking recognition of their relationship, 169 we would
be one step closer to making transsexual existence possible under
law.
170
B. Lessons from the Prison Dilemma
I have argued that the legal system should recognize the concept
of a gender continuum in matters concerning transsexual relation-
ships. The problem with gender categorization in the marriage and
divorce cases above is that courts are looking at the ability of partners
to have heterosexual intercourse.1 71 The factor those courts should
167. 355 A.2d at 208.
168. Id.
169. In fact, this analysis should not be limited to couples, but should consider nonmonog-
amy and include threesomes, foursomes, or however many individuals share in a given relation-
ship as defined by those individuals. That analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
170. See supra Part I (explaining why transsexuals, with respect to their relationships with
others, are legally impossible beings).
171. Their analysis does not, of course, apply to traditionally recognized male and female
heterosexual couples. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (questioning the practice of
allowing marriages between heterosexuals who cannot procreate, but barring marriage between
co-genital partners for precisely that reason).
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have instead considered, and better still, acknowledged, is the gen-
der identity of each party 72 Arguably, though, dissolving the catego-
ries we assign on the basis of genitalia, as opposed to a chosen gen-
der identity, may be easier to discard when the issue is sanctioning
intimate relationships. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, gender
categorization will be moot in this context if same-sex marriages be-
come legally available in the united states.'73
In other contexts, however, as in assigning transsexuals convicted
of crimes to sex-segregated prisons, the incentive to blur bipolar
gender categories is perhaps less salient. Consider these scenarios: a
guard corners a male to female transsexual in a bathroom of an all-
male prison, forcibly undresses her and sexually assaults her; 74 an
inmate brutally beats and rapes a transsexual prisoner shortly after
officials release her into the general prison population;'75 a transsex-
ual prisoner is forced to strip in a crowd of inmates, guards, and
other officials shouting derogatory comments about her physical ap-176
pearance. In this section I will briefly look beyond the one-penis-
per-union analysis to explore the prison dilemma and consider
whether rigid gender categories have merit in other contexts, and if
so, how. 177
The idea that the state may have a valid reason 7 to assign a sex or
gender label to an individual is poignantly raised in the 1994
172. In other words, courts measured transsexuals in comparison with the partners they
chose, rather than in consideration of the gender with which they identify.
173. Again, I am not advocating that the queer rights movement seek legalization of same-
sex marriages, but rather acknowledging that it may happen.
174. Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 106 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir. 1997). On an-
other occasion, prison officials placed Murray in solitary confinement because an inmate as-
saulted her. Id. at 403. Once in the prison cafeteria, two guards cornered Murray, harassed her
about her appearance, and conducted a pat-down search during which one guard purposely
fondled her breasts. Id.
175. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
176. Meriwetherv. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987).
177. For analysis of legally-imposed gender assignments in the labor context, see Ulane v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Tide VII's sex-based employ-
ment discrimination protections do not apply to transsexuals, where an airline hired Kenneth
Ulane as a pilot in 1968, but fired her as Karen Ulane, shortly after her sex reassignment sur-
gery in 1980).
178. From a Constitutional perspective, the level of scrutiny applied to sex-based classifica-
tions has long been intermediate scrutiny, where the state can show a substantial government
interest in maintaining the distinction. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (setting forth
the standard that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"). After United States v. Com-
monwealth of Virginia, however, the Court may be on its way to raising sex-based classifications
to strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling governmental interest. 96 F.3d 114 (1996) (stating that
sex-based classifications should be subject to "heightened scrutiny"). An equal protection analy-
sis in the following prison cases, though, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Supreme Court decision Farmer v. Brennan.'7 The case involved Dee
Farmer, a male to female "pre-operative"80 transsexual convicted of
credit card fraud in 1986, when she was eighteen years old."" Speak-
ing for the Court, Justice Souter described Farmer's "feminine" ap-
pearance, noticeably avoiding gender specific pronouns, as follows:
For several years before being convicted ... petitioner wore
women's clothing, (as petitioner did at the 1986 trial), underwent
estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants, and submitted
to unsuccessful 'blackmarket' testicle removal surgery. Petitioner's
precise appearance in prison is unclear from the record before us,
but petitioner claims to have continued hormonal treatment while
incarcerated by using drugs smuggled into prison, and apparently
wears clothing in a feminine manner, as by displaying a shirt 'off
one shoulder.'
18 2
Farmer had been segregated from other inmates for her own
"safety concerns" in at least one prison."' Nonetheless, in 1989,
prison officials transferred Farmer from a federal correctional facility
to an all-male federal penitentiary which "hous[ed] more trouble-
some prisoners. " s4 Ultimately, within two weeks of her transfer, an
inmate brutally beat and raped Farmer in her cell.185 Farmer filed a
complaint stating that "prison officials placed her in the penitentiary
population knowing that, as a transsexual, she inevitably would be
targeted for sexual attack at an institution with a history of violence
179. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
180. As noted earlier, the term "pre-operative" is usually a misnomer, given that many trans-
sexuals may undergo a number of anatomically altering operations from facial surgery to mas-
tectomies or breast implantations prior to, if ever, having genital re/construction. For consis-
tency with legal usage, I use the term pre-operative in this context to refer to individuals who
are pre-genital-re/construction.
181. 114 S. CLt. at 1975. Farmer is now serving a twenty-year federal sentence. Id. at 1986
(Blackmun,J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1975 (citations omitted). Briefs filed in support of Farmer noted the prison offi-
cials' admission that because of Farmer's "youth and feminine appearance" she is "likely to ex-
perience a great deal of sexual pressure in prison." Id. at 1984. See generally Murray, 106 F.3d at
402 (condoning prison officials' decisions to repeatedly place Murray in solitary confinement for
not wearing a brassiere).
183. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975.
184. Id. The record is unclear, but apparently officials transferred Farmer in part because
she caused disciplinary problems. Id.
185. Id. at 1975. In remarking on Farmer's "brutal" attack, Justice Blackmun noted, "[t]he
horrors experienced by many young inmates, particularly those who, like petitioner, are con-
victed of nonviolent offenses, border on the unimaginable." Id. at 1987. "Although formally
sentenced to a term of incarceration, many inmates discover that their punishment, even for
nonviolent offenses like credit-card fraud or tax evasion, denigrates into a reign of terror un-
mitigated by the protection supposedly afforded by prison officials." Id. at 1987 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). According to Justice Thomas, "[r] egrettably, '[s] ome level of brutality and sexual
aggression among [prisoners] is inevitable no matter what the guards do... unless all prisoners
are locked in their cells 24 hours a day and sedated." Id. at 1990 (ThomasJ, concurring).
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and inmate assaults," 86 in violation of her Constitutional protection• 187
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court held that
Farmer's placement did not violate the Eighth Amendment, because
that protection applies only to cruel and unusual "punishment," not
"conditions" of imprisonment.""
Although the Court entertained the idea that Farmer, as a trans-
sexual with "feminine characteristics," did not belong in an all-male
prison in the first place, the decision ultimately held that prison offi-
cials had not acted with reckless disregard for her safety by exposing
her to the general prison population.' 9 Farmer does not specifically
mandate, however, that all transsexuals can be placed in prisons re-
gardless of their gender.90 The Court acknowledged the present
standard used to assign transsexuals to single sex prisons: "It is the
practice of the federal prison authorities to incarcerate persons who
have completed sexual reassignment with prisoners of the transsex-
ual's new gender, but to incarcerate persons who have not com-
pleted it with prisoners of the transsexual's original gender."' 9'
Farmer's tragic, but not uncommon, situation and the Supreme, • •192
Court's indifferent response, calls into question the role of sex-
based, genital distinctions in the prison context. 9 3 For the moment,
I will assume that sex-segregated prisons are necessary, and therefore
the state will, at times, need to assign a sex or gender to individu-
als.9 Although some commentators argue that rapes are inevitable
186. Id. at 1975. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 324 (1977) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (admonishing the majority for permitting exciusion of female correctional officers
from working at an all-male prison on the basis that women are innately sexual objects. The
decision relies on the "depraved conduct of inmates" to discriminate against and "punish
women because their very presence might provoke sexual assaults." Id.).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. VIH.
188. 114 S. Ct. at 1979. The Court further stated that prison officials will be held liable for
denying humane conditions under the Eighth Amendment only if they "know that inmates face
a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard that risk by fhiling to take reasonable measures
to abate it." Id. at 1984. The Court remanded the case for determination as to whether the dis-
trict court gave too much deference to allegations that Farmer had not voiced objections to the
transfer. Id. at 1985.
189. 114 S. Ct. at 1976.
190. See id. at 1975 (acknowledging different standards applied to transsexual prisoners).
191. Id. at 1975 (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319,320 (1993)).
192. Id. at 1970. See, e.g., Murray, 106 F.3d at 401 (rejecting a transsexual's daims that on
several different occasions inmates and officials verbally harassed and physically assaulted her).
193. Most prisons, federal and state, are segregated on the basis of sex, while some jails
house both men and women, but in separate sections. See SEX DIScRIMINATION AND THE LAW
supra note 120, at 286.
194. See infra notes 280-88 and accompanying text (posing the debate over whether sex-
segregation is useful or necessary in prisons).
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in prisons, 95 no amount of administrative efficiency justifies placing
a transsexual in an environment to face almost certain assault. The
196
standard applied in Farmer is inadequate. A new standard for as-
signing sex or gender to prisoners should be adopted.
At least three possible criteria could be applied in categorizing
inmates for assignment to single-sex prisons: chromosomes; genita-
lia, congenital or constructed; and gender identity.
1. Assignment by Chromosomes
Using chromosomal analysis to determine who goes where, in es-
sence, is worse than the standard already in place. Through chro-
mosome-based assignments, a male to female transsexual who has
undergone genital reassignment, for example, would go to an all-
male prison. She would no doubt be in constant jeopardy of rape,
assaults and humiliation.19 Even Farmer, who had not had genital
re/construction was singled out, assaulted and raped. This standard
is simply not plausible and is not currently applied at the federal
prison level.
2. Assignment by Genitalia
The second alternative, using genitalia as a criteria for assignment,
is the standard currently used. This standard distinguishes between
congenital and constructed genitalia, but, as Farmer illustrates, this
criteria opens some transsexuals to misplacement and inmate at-
tacks."' To reiterate, the standard provides for sending "post-
operative" transsexuals to single-sex facilities consonant with their
gender identity. Transsexuals who have not had genital
re/construction, on the other hand, are assigned to a facility conso-
195. See supra note 185; ROTHBILATr, supra note 12, at 62 (arguing that "[classifing people
by sex so that they can be incarcerated accordingly has done nothing to prevent jailhouse
rape").
196. "What every population subgroup needs is to be treated as persons, not as demograph-
ics." RoTHBLAT'r, supra note 12, at 86.
197. Use of chromosomal analysis has been denied in the context of birth certificate
changes. See In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S. 2d 834 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (rejecting a chromosomal test,
stating that "were it not for the fact that the petitioner's background was known to the court,
the court would have found it impossible to distinguish this person from any other female." Id.
at 838.). See also supra notes 65-71 (discussing the underlying assumptions in the Anonymous
court's analysis).
198. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a transsex-
ual had a valid cause of action under the Eighth Amendment where prison officials, inter alia,
failed to protect her from sexual assaults and other acts of violence and forced her to strip in
front of a guard and other inmates).
199. For an explanation of standards applied at other prison levels, see supra note 190.
200. While I recognize inmate assaults also occur for reasons unrelated to sex, in this analy-
sis I am proposing ways to eliminate a specific risk factor.
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nant with their congenital sex, regardless of how far along they may
be in altering their anatomy."' In addition, the standard is inade-
quate because it invites a problematic slippery slope and raises sig-
nificant issues regarding class privilege, as I will discuss below." 2
After being assigned under the current standard, Farmer sued
prison officials in a separate case for denying her hormonal and psy-
chiatric treatment. Upon recounting the federal prison standard
for assigning transsexuals to single-sex p"sons, the Circuit judge
described how Farmer had been prescribed continuing estrogen
therapyr at the age of fourteen, had breast implants, but still had a
penis. The judge explained,
the usual next step would have been an operation to remove the
male sexual organs and create, from penile tissue, a simulacrum of
a vagina. However, for reasons that are unclear Farmer did not
have the operation - at least not one performed by a surgeon.
Farmer did have what the briefs call a 'black market' operation to
remove her testicles, but, odd as it may seem, the operation was
unsuccessful. Yet, while retaining the male sex organsg Farmer
lived as a woman for five years before being imprisoned.
Farmer had been taking estrogen, which, among other things, sof-
tens skin texture and causes breast growth.2 7  She had had breast
implants. She had attempted to remove her testicles. Her penis re-
mained intact, presumably so that surgeons could invert it to resem-
218ble a vagina. Suppose Farmer's back alley surgery had been suc-
cessful, and she had been arrested one day before surgery to invert
her penis. She may have had all intentions of having the type of sur-
gery required under the current prison assignment standard, but
would have missed her opportunity to follow through at the last
201. See, e.g., Murray, 106 F.3d at 401 (holding that even though Murray had been castrated
and had breasts, she still had a penis, which was a correct basis for assignment to an all-male
prison); Farmer, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (finding presence of an external penis as a proper basis
for assignment to an all-male prison); Meriwether, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (having an exter-
nal penis was a sufficient basis upon which to assign a transexual to an all-male prison).
202. A host of other issues also affect this standard, like racism, homophobia, and sexism,
which are equally significant, but beyond the scope of this discussion.
203. Farmerv. Haas, 990 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1993).
204. Id. at 320.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 18-19. Some transsexuals also experience genital reduc-
tion, water retention and mood swings. Id. at 19.
208. See generally BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 15-19 (explaining the surgical processes in-
volved in male to female sex reassignment).
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moment.'0 Perhaps what is worse, officials denied her access to es-
trogen therapy in the all-male prison.20  Farmer is sentenced not
only to thirty years of incarceration, but to thirty years in a body that
does not fit - all because she had a penis, and despite being
"ostensibly" female.1
The current standard of placing pre-operative transsexuals in all-
male prisons is indeed cruel and unusual punishment, because
medical providers in such facilities have denied transsexuals unique212 213
care and therapy.
214In Meriwether v. Faulkner prison authorities placed Lavarita• • 215
Merinwether, a pre-operative male to female transsexual, in an all-
216
male prison. The medical director at the facility told her that for
as long as she was in that facility, "she would never receive the medi-
cation [estrogen] and that he would make sure of this."217 Meri-
wether did not receive the estrogen treatments she had been receiv-
1 21-ing for the previous rune years and consequently developed severe
withdrawal symptoms.2'9  Also, prison physicians refused to treat
complications she experienced related to her silicone breast im-
209. Sex reassignment is time-consuming. According to Bornstein, genital surgery is just
one step in a long process of sex reassignment. The process begins with two years of psycho-
logical therapy, during which the individual may begin hormonal treatments. Two therapists
must agree that genital surgery is acceptable for a particular individual, even before that person
may begin to look for a cooperative surgeon. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 15-19.
210. Although the Supreme Court decision states that Farmer had been able to continue
her estrogen treatments, she did so only through smuggling the hormone into prison. Her
source was not guaranteed and officials did not provide the treatment to her. Farmer, 114 S. Ct.
at 1972.
211. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (finding that a trans-
sexual would not be classified as the sex of her chosen gender, absent "surgical intervention").
212. See, e.g., Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 410; Murray, 1997 WL 34677 at *2 (holding that hair and
skin products necessary for a male to female transsexual prisoner to maintain a feminine ap-
pearance may be withheld as part of the "routine discomfort [which] is part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay").
213. SeeFarmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975 (stating that Farmer had to smuggle estrogen into prison);
Meriwether 821 F.2d at 410 (reporting that Meriwether had been denied all previous chemical
and psychiatric treatment once her incarceration began).
214. 821 F.2d at 410. In 1982, a federal district court sentenced Lavarita Meriwether, a male
to female transsexual, to 35 years for committing a murder. Id.
215. The court designated Meriwether as "pre-operative" even though she had had several
operations to augment her facial structures, hips, and breasts. Id. at 410.
216. The court described Meriwether as a person who "has feminine mannerisms, wears
makeup and feminine clothing and undergarments when permitted, considers herself to be a
female, and in fact has been living as a female since the age of fourteen." Id at 410.
217. Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
218. Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 410. From the first day of her incarceration, prison physicians
denied Meriwether all medical treatment, "chemical, psychiatric, or otherwise." Id.
219. Id. The court does not specify what type of symptoms she suffered.
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Similarly, Michelle Murray, a male to female transsexual, chal-
lenged prison officials' refusal to provide her with ade uate hormo-
nal therapy in Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons. According
to the court, the "policy of the Bureau of Prisons is to provide a
transsexual prisoner with the level of female hormones necessary to
ensure that she neither progresses nor regresses in the development• • • ,,222
of feminine attributes. Because transsexuality is a "recognized
medical disorder," the court held that transsexuals generally need
"some sort of treatment" such that to completely withhold any
treatment would violate the Eighth Amendment.M In Murray's case,
prison officials had been giving her a lower dosage of hormones
224than she had been receiving prior to incarceration. In rejecting
Murray's claim, the court emphasized that although Murray had a
right to some level of medical treatment, she did not have a right to
any particular treatment, like estrogen therapy, and with respect to
transsexual inmates, courts "should defer to the informed judgment
of prison officials as to the appropriate form of medical treat-
ment."2 5 The court essentially ignored Murray's need for hormonal
treatment and placed her and other transsexual inmates at the po-
226tentially unqualified, merciless hands of prison officials like the
one who purposefully prevented Meriwether from receiving hor-
mones in prison.
In addition to hormone therapy, Murray and Meriwether had sur-
gically altered their bodies.227 The Meriwether court explains in detail
220. Id.
221. 106 F.3d 401 (1997).
222. Id. at 403.
223. Id. (stating that "deliberate indifference to medical needs" would be a valid claim un-
der the Eighth Amendment).
224. Id. Even though Murray had brought this discrepancy in dosages to prison physicians'
attention on several occasions at several different prisons, officials consistently refused to cor-
rect her dosages. Id.
225. Murray, 106 F.3d at 404 (quoting Metiwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.
1987); see also Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967,970 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a male to female
transsexual had a right to medical treatment, but not necessarily estrogen therapy); White v.
Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that a transsexual prisoner's right to medical
treatment does not include hormone therapy).
226. Specialized therapists diagnose and work with these individuals who have, as it is medi-
cally defined, "gender dysphoria." Hormone therapy is prescribed in conjunction with psycho-
logical therapy - a mode of insight and treatment not likely to be available to transsexuals
through the general practitioners found in state and federal prisons. See BORNSTEIN, supra note
7, at 14-15 (describing the types of therapy transsexuals usually receive).
227. Murray, 106 F.3d at 401 (noting that she was castrated and had breast implants); Men-




how Meriwether had "undergone surgical augmentation of her facial
structure, breasts, and hips so as to alter her body shape to resemble
that of a biological female."228 Despite having multiple operations to
further her sex reassignment, however, officials placed her in an all-
229
male prison. Likewise, in Murray's case, the Sixth Circuit held that
despite her hormone therapy, breast implants and castration, Murray
"remain[ed] anatomically male" and thus the Federal Bureau of
Prisons properly assigned her to an all-male prison. Neither had
had genital surgery to invert their penises.2s ' In essence, the only
surgery that matters under the current standard is manipulation of a
penis. Unfortunately, as Farmer, Meriwether, and Murray show, no
matter how much an individual looks like a biological female, she
will be assigned according to the presence or absence of an external
233penis.
Finally, these cases beg the question, what is "genitalia," or the ba-
sis upon which federal prisons determine who has "completed sexual
reassignment"?m If the standard refers to presence or absence of
"external genital organs,",s 5 Farmer, Meriwether and Murray could
be assigned, as they were, to all-male prisons because neither had
removed her external penis before the moment of assignment.236 A
female to male transsexual, on the other hand, would have to surgi-
cally remove his vulva s 7 to be rid of female genitalia. Not all female
to male transsexuals choose to undergo this procedure. s  Moreover,
based solely on external genitalia, many women who have been cir-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Murray, 106 F.3d at 401.
231. Id.; Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 410.
232. That is, a female to male transsexual must have a "simulacrum" of an attached penis, a
male to female transsexual must have a "simulacrum" of a vagina.
233. An electronic database search yielded no prison cases involving a female to male trans-
sexual. Presumably, under the current anatomy-based standard, a "pre-operative" female to
male transsexual, i.e., without an external, attached penis, would be assigned to a prison based
on his congenital sex.
234. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (stating the standard for sex and prison as-
signments).
235. WEBSTEWS COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 486 (10th ed. 1994) (claiming this definition as
the primary usage of the term) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
236. See id. at 858 (defining "penis" as "a male organ of copulation").
237. "The external parts of the female genital organs." Id. at 1326.
238. Likewise, not all male to female transsexuals undergo genital reconstruction. Bornstein
refers to these people as "non-operatives" because they choose not to reconfigure their anatomy
to fit their gender, despite social mandates to do so. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 119. See Taitz,
supra note 25, at 56 (stating that most transsexuals do not undergo complete reassignment sur-
gery due to financial restrictions as well as physical or psychological constraints).
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cumcisede' but identify as women, would qualify under the present
standard, to be assigned to an all-male prison. If "genitalia" refers.240
generally to "the organs of the reproductive system," a male to fe-
male transsexual like Farmer, whose testicle removal was unsuccess-
ful, and Meriwether, whose testicles were chemically reduced but
physically apparent, would be sent to an all-male prison, regardless of
whether they had reconstructed other organs. Moreover, with re-
spect to both male and female transsexuals, what constitutes
"reproductive" organs?24 Alternatively, "genitalia" could refer simply
"242to "a sexual organ. In that sense, Fanner, Meriwether, and Mur-
ray, having enlarged breasts and "ostensibly female" attributes, as
well as male sexual organs, could have been assigned to either
sex/prison. A female to male transsexual could remove her breasts,
get a penile prosthesis, and still have a vulva. 243 She, too, could be
arbitrarily assigned to a specific prison.
The only way to avoid this trap, this rejection of one's chosen and
performed gender,244 is to undergo complete surgical sex reassign-
ment as early as possible. 4' The surgery, however, is costly, time-
consuming, and can only be performed with approval of a psycho-
therapist who has evaluated the individual's choice over one to two
years. The cost of the surgery itself, including one to two weeks in
the hospital and the surgeon's fees amounted to approximately eight
thousand dollars in 1985. 24  When inflation and lost wages are fac-
tored into that amount, the costs are significant. Also, this surgery is
239. See generaUy Layli Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: An Examina-
tion of Criminal and Asylum Law, 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 415, 420-21 (1996) (describing various
degrees of female circumcision, or "genital mutilation," two of which involve removal of the
vulva).
240. WEBSTER'S, supra note 235, at 486.
241. SeePart :I.D.2. (explaining the impossibility of procreation for most transsexuals).
242. WEBSTER'S, supra note 235, at 485-86 (defining "genital" as "of, relating to, or being a
sexual organ"). The term "sexual" is defined as "of, related to, or associated with sex or the
sexes," including differentiation. Id. at 1074.
243. Likewise, if female to male transsexuals could have a prosthetic device or a surgically
constructed, though not fully functional penis, they would not be assigned to a male prison, the
prison of their surgically reassigned sex - even after surgery. If female to male transsexuals opt
for incarceration with inmates of their same gender identity, these individuals would be denied
that recognition, based on their lack of a functional penis.
244. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 119.
245. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 217 (expanding the definition of transsexuals to in-
clude not only pre-operative and postoperative persons, but also "nonoperative" transsexuals).
246. Pearlman, supra note 8, at 842 (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash.
1993)); BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 15-16. A second psychotherapist's opinion is necessary be-
fore a surgeon may perform a genital reassignement. Id.
247. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that in 1985, she spent nine days in the hospital
at a rate of four thousand dollars for hospital care and four thousand dollars for her surgeon).
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not available in all hospitals, so many transsexuals also incur travel248
expenses. Finally, sex reassignment surgery is not currently cov-•.• 249
ered by most governmental health insurance policies, therefore,
"[d]ue to financial requirements, the fulfillment of the surgical
dream is subject to cultural and class constraints; cosmetic and geni-
tal conversion surgery is available primarily to the middle and upper
classes."5 Consequently, low income transsexuals will suffer most
when genitalia is used as the basis for categorization, as in prison as-
signments.5
3. Assignment by Gen Identity
The third possible standard is based on gender identity. This
standard is not only consistent with my analysis in the marriage and
divorce cases, but also with the individual's chosen and performed
gender identity. Under this standard, the law would focus on an in-
dividual's gender performance, rather than on the stage of surgical
reassignment a transsexual has attained. I introduce the concept of
"gender performance" to underscore, particularly in this context,
that "[w]e perform our identities, which include gender, and we per-
form our relationships, which include sex. Transgender is simply
identity more consciously performed on the infrequently used play-
ing field of gender."2 12 Using this third standard, if a person lives as
a woman and commits a crime as a woman, she will go to prison as a
253
woman.
I recognize the potential for a slippery slope in applying this crite-
ria. That is, the possibility that all-female prisons will be overrun by
248. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 18 (recalling that she had to fly to Colorado for her
surgery).
249. See Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to mandate health care
coverage of sex reassignment surgery); but see Doe v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare,
257 N.W. 2d 816 (Minn. 1977) (holding that under the Medicaid Program, total exclusion of
medical assistance for sex reassignment surgery violated federal regulations). Although the
court refused to hold that sex reassignment surgery should automatically be covered under the
plan, it also suggested that the medical need for each applicant should not be determined "on
a case by case basis." Id at 820.
250. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 119.
251. According to Bornstein, "[t]ranssexuals, especially middle-class pre-operative trans-
sexuals, are heavily invested in maintaining their status as 'diseased' people. The demedicaliza-
tion of transsexuality would further limit surgery in this culture, as it would remove the label of
'illness' and so prohibit insurance companies from footing the bill." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at
119.
252. BORNSTEIN, supranote 7, at 124.
253. Unfortunately, this standard also requires the unsavory task of performing a single, po-
larized gender, exhibiting either traditionally defined masculine or feminine characteristics.
The model of a gender continuum, while socially positive, has not found acceptance under law.
Thus, the standard I propose is structured to fit within the law as it is today.
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thousands of Maxwell Klingers,5 or Jack the Rippers25 in lipstick, or
transvestites, 2 6 who will enter women's prisons and rape inmates to
an extent more frequent than what already occurs.
The standard can work, however, if a basic background check is
done on individuals asserting transsexual status. 8 For example, in-
dications that a person is transsexual and actively performs the gen-
der of her or his chosen identity, can be ascertained from three pri-
mary criteria: presentation of gender-specific ostensible••259 . 260
characteristics, psychological evaluations, and overall gender per-
formance.261  Insofar as I argue the law should allow for a gender
continuum, I must also acknowledge that the law breeds and feeds
262on categories and standards. With that fact in mind, and until the
law accepts a gender continuum, I propose the following criteria.
Ostensible Characteristics. Ostensible factors to consider would be
254. Maxwell Klinger, a main character on the television sitcom, "MAS.H.," was best known
for dressing in traditionally female, civilian attire in an effort to be dishonorably discharged
from military service.
255. Jack the Ripper is the prototypical serial rapist and crazed murderer. See MURDER BY
DECREE (Highlight Theatrical Production 1979) (portraying the life and crimes of this notorious
psychopath).
256. Transvestites are, generally speaking, male heterosexuals who dress in traditionally
feminine attire for sexual arousal, rather than for social comfort, and are content living as the
sex into which they were born/acculturated. Transvestite females are rarely identified because
wearing traditionally masculine attire, like pants and work boots, is generally acceptable for
women. The definition is, I suppose, in the mind of the cross-clothed. See, e.g., Taitz, supra note
25, at 54 (listing a variety of people with characteristics related to transvesdtism); AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 530
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (suggesting cross-dressing occurs only among males, usually
heterosexual males seeking sexual stimulation from wearing traditionally female attire).
257. See Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman's Verion of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Cross-Gender,
Clothed-Body Searches of Women Pisoners 6 UCILA WOMEN'S Lj. 85, 107 n.110 (1995) (citing wide-
spread instances of sexual abuse in all-female prisons perpetrated by male prison guards, not
female inmates). In 1986, nearly two hundred women reported that male prison guards had
raped them in a Georgia all-female prison over a thirteen year period. Id. (citation omitted).
Female prisoners in Hawaii and Indiana have come forward with similar stories. Id. (citations
omitted).
258. Although this standard is aimed at recognizing transsexuals prior to prison assignment,
proper medical and psychological attention should be paid to persons exploring their trans-
sexuality after entering prison. If an individual acts on his or her transsexuality for a time period
and in a manner that would qualify under this standard, that person should then be assigned to
a prison consonant with his or her gender identity.
259. See generally Pearlman, supra note 8, at 849-854.
260. See generally Pearlman, supra note 8, at 855 n.97.
261. See generally Pearlman, supra note 8, at 850. Moreover, it is improbable that congenital
males would pretend to be transsexual prior to committing a crime, with the hope that, if
caught, they will serve their sentence in a female prison; if they had committed themselves to
that much research, they would also know that women's prisons are deficient in nearly every
possible program as compared to all-male prisons. See SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, supra
note 120, at 286.
262. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (explaining the social and legal desire to
create categories and standards).
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found primarily in physical appearance. One's projected image in-
cludes, for example, gender-normative styles and choice of clothing.
Of course, this factor is difficult to assess without getting caught in
rigidly defining feminine and masculine styles and how men and
263
women are expected to dress. Physical characteristics to look at
might include non-genital surgeries on various body parts like hips,
face, breasts (implants or mastectomies), and others.2 4 An impor-
tant consideration, though, is the cost of surgery, which is not neces-
sarily accessible to lower income transsexuals. Using these types of
indicators creates a category of particularly oppressive, prescribed
gender traits, by specifying what appearance one must project in or-
der to qualify as male or female under law. Consequently, this cate-
gory should be given less weight than the following two criteria.
Psychological Evaluations. This criteria may be determined largely
from the same criteria the American Psychiatric Association uses to
identify individuals with transsexual status.26 Courts, prison officials,
and other parties should defer to the expertise of a psychotherapist's
evaluations based on these relevant factors:
a. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely
a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other
sex) ... In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested by
symptoms such as a stated desire to be the other sex, frequent pass-
ing as the other sex, desire to live and be treated as the other sex,
or the conviction that he or she has the typical feelings and reac-
tions of the other sex.
b. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappro-
priateness in the gender role of that sex... In adolescents and
adults the disturbance is manifested by symptoms such as preoccu-
pation with getting rid of primary and secondary sex characteristics
(e.g., requests for hormones, surgery, or other procedures to
physically alter sexual characteristics to simulate the other sex) or
belief that he or she was born in the wrong sex.
c. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex con-
263. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 1987-90 (exploring how drag queens, lesbians, and gays
disrupt heterosexual gender norms in many ways, including through their choices of clothing.
"([G]ays and lesbians ... pick and choose aspects of masculinity and femininity and recombine
them for erotic effect. Each of these combinations disrupts the heterosexual matrix... In the
same way that the drag queen disconnects anatomical sex from gender, the lipstick lesbian dis-
connects gender from sexuality." Id. at 1988). I offer this factor - that transsexuals should con-
fine themselves to a rigidly dictated style of clothing which is consistent with their chosen gen-
der -with sincere reservations, given that it reinforces rigid gender roles.
264. Other physical traits could include a shaved down adam's apple in male to female
transsexuals and increased facial hair (due to hormone ingestion) in female to male transsexu-
als. See DSM-IV, supra note 256, at 535.
265. These criteria are listed in DSM-IV, supra note 256, at 532-38.
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dition.
d. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impair-
ment in social, occupational, or other imporrtant areas of func-
266tioning.
The psychological criteria used in determining when an individual
is transsexual are extensive.267  These criteria distinguish "simple
nonconformity to stereotypical sex role behavior," transvestic activi-
ties, and other behaviors from the gender identity assertions made
261by transsexuals. While many transsexuals are evaluated by a psy-
chotherapist prior to beginning hormone therapy and surgical al-
terations, some may not have been. An independent psychological
evaluation could be conducted with an individual asserting transsex-
ual status who has not previously sought psychological counseling.
Gender Performance. Psychotherapists require transsexuals to take a
"life test" during which transsexuals dress, live and work in the so-
cially prescribed role of their chosen gender for at least a year.269 If,
for example, a congenital female cannot function socially or occupa-
tionally as a man, doctors will discourage her from pursuing a differ-
ent gender identity.20  If an individual performs his or her chosen
gender to the satisfaction of therapists, that individual will be identi-
fied as transsexual and will be considered for genital reassignment271
surgery. By the same token, whether an individual has been func-
tioning socially and economically in the role of his or her chosen
gender should be taken into account when assigning transsexuals to
272
single-sex prisons. Using the "life test" as a model for this criteria
does not mean an individual must prove she or he has been living in
the role of her chosen gender identity for a specified, supervised pe-
266. Id. at 537-38. In law, the word "disturbance" could be removed from these guidelines in
exchange for a more accurate descriptor, like "nonconformity."
267. Id. at 532-37.
268. DSM-IV, supra note 256, at 536-37. Transvestism is merely cross-dressing for sexual ex-
citement. The DSM-IV labels transsexuals as having "gender identity disorder" -a label I choose
not to use here because it implies transsexuality is a disease or illness. In reality, transsexuality
is a healthy, asserted nonconformity to socially constructed sex and gender roles. But see supra
note 251 (suggesting that lowincome transsexuals have a particular stake in maintaining the
medical status of transsexuality for insurance purposes).
269. BORNSTiN, supra note 7, at 15; Pearlman, supra note 8, at 842.
270. BORNTEwN, supra note 7, at 15.
271. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 15.
272. Unfortunately, requiring transsexuals to prove they have lived according to the norma-
tive, socially-constructed gender role ascribed to their chosen gender identity fails to challenge
rigid, polarized definitions of male/female and masuline/feminine. SeePearlman, supra note 8,
at 842 (noting"[t]he requirement that a transsexual must undergo this process to realign sex to
conform with gender, reinforces the binary construction of sex and gender"). Moreover, those
aspects of the "life test" which require individuals to be employed in their chosen gender role
are "fraught with various forms of employment discrimination." Id.
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iod of time. Instead, the "life test" should serve as a model for
evaluating how an asserted transsexual lived his or her life prior to
conviction for a crime. The length of time an individual has per-
formed her or his chosen gender should be considered in addition
to, not in place of, how an individual performs gender.
With these criteria in mind, I return to the prison cases discussed
above. In Farmer and Meriwether, the petitioners had openly identi-
fied with a gender inconsistent with their sex at birth for five and
nine years respectively.23 They had both undergone physician-
supervised hormone therapy and various degrees of physical altera-
274tion. Using the criteria I have proposed, Farmer and Meriwether
would have been assigned to a prison for females, and may have
avoided the assaults and abuse they endured in the all-male prisons.
Also, if reliable criteria are established and applied, the likelihood of
a "pre-operative" male to female transsexual raping female prisoners
is presumably the same as for any other female inmate.2
With respect to female to male transsexuals, the situation is an ar-
guable exception. Can we still say that if a person lives as a male,
commits a crime as a male, he will go to prison as a male? In Farmer,
Justice Ginsburg criticized the argument that Farmer, as a transsex-
ual, should not have been sent to an all-male prison, and asked,
"What about a young man of a slight build?"276 If we assume that
many female to male transsexuals may be of "slight build," 277 com-
pared to other male inmates, it may be tempting, in an effort to
avoid additional risk of assaults, to exclude female to male trans-
sexuals from placement in all-male prisons. Moreover, genital re-
construction is more obvious in female to male transsexuals 278 which
would place them at greater risk of being identified and assaulted by
other inmates, especially if access to androgens/hormones is re-
stricted.
Excluding female to male transsexuals from the same gendered
prison assignments male to female transsexuals would experience is
inconsistent, however, with the goal of recognizing gender identity
273. Farmer, 990 F.2d at 320; Meiweher 821 F.2d at 410. I have omitted Murray from this
analysis, merely because the court did not provide as much background about her transsexual-
ity.
274. Farmer, 990 F.2d at 320; Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 410.
275. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 191 (suggesting that gender identity answers the ques-
tion of "who I am," whereas sexual preference answers who "I want to be romantically or sexu-
ally involved with").
276. See ROTHBLATr, supranote 12, at 62.
277. This assumption is, of course, a gross generalization intended only for the purpose of
analysis.
278. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 217.
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in law. As with female-identified transsexuals, male-identified trans-
sexuals would be assigned to a prison according to gender identity,
rather than anatomy.
A different alternative to current sex-based prison assignments has
been proposed by Martine Rothblatt and other commentators.
280
The alternative is to increase the current number of co-correctional
or "multi-sexed"2' facilities, which house both men and women.
This proposal offers a solution to the unequal treatment and mini-
mal financial resources allocated to all-women's prisons,"' as well as
incentive to create a rehabilitative environment closely resembling
the real world.2" As part of this plan, Rosemary Herbert envisions
that
[t]he mixing of men and women in the same cells would not be a
feature of such a remedy, since the legitimate privacy and security
interests would require separate cells for men and women. The
structure of the prison and the degree of unrestricted movement
permitted in the relevant housing unit would dictate whether men
and women should be separated by room, hall, or by cell block...
Low security prisons could be patterned after the federal co-
correctional institutions, but medium and maximum security pris-
ons would require geater security measures and a more con-
trolled environment.
279. Giien that nearly 98% of all rapes occurring outside prisons are perpetrated by males
on females, the concept of putting a female to male transsexual in an all-male prison, particu-
larly a transsexual who has not undergone genital reconstruction, may seem misguided. An al-
ternative to this assignment might be found in arguing rationales used in Title VII employment
discrimination cases. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, for example, the Supreme Court held that be-
cause sex offenders are spread throughout prison dormitories, all-male prisons are not safe for
female guards, and thus, the state may legally discriminate against women by not hiring them
for these positions. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). On the flip side, Justice Marshall dissented, and stated
that "this rationale regrettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of all the old myths about
women - that women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects." Id. at 330 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (noting also that women are made to pay the price for the threat of "depraved conduct
by prison inmates." Id.).
280. See ROTHBLATr, supra note 12, at 62; SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, supra note 120,
at 286.
281. ROTHBLATr, supra note 12, at 62.
282. See SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAWV, supra note 120, at 286-89 (citing several cases
filed by female inmates asserting conditions unequal to those in male prisons). See, e.g., McCoy
v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521 (D. Nev. 1991) (holding that female inmates had a
cause of action in a claim asserting inequalities in vocational, occupational, and educational
training programs, medical screening, law library, opportunities to earn good-time credit, and
building conditions and maintenance).
283. See ROTHBLATT, supra note 12, at 62. See also SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, supra
note 120, at 287 (indicating that co-correctional facilities will further the correctional goal of
reintegration into the community).
284. Rosemary Herbert, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94 YALE LJ. 1182
(1985) (quoted in SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAWv, supra note 120, at 287).
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With respect to potential childbirth problems inherent in such a
proposal, proponents of multi-sexed institutions suggest that all in-
mates be injected with temporary contraceptives which can be re-
moved upon release from prison.28 Others suggest sexual contact
between inmates is inevitable, but that "coerced sexual relations
should be strictly and effectively prohibited in integrated institu-
tions, as they should now be in single-sex prisons."286
The problem with this proposal is, however, that male sex offend-
ers alone comprise a significant proportion of prison populations,
whereas the overall population of female inmates is relatively small.
2 8 7
Not only will coerced sexual relations continue if prisons are multi-
sexed, but "[t] he small number of incarcerated women limits the ex-
tent to which desegregation is currently feasible. Unless integration
is to be token, or to produce cruel and unusual conditions, some all-
male prisons are inevitable.",288 Hence, desegregation may improve the
unequal treatment of women in single-sex facilities, but it will not
reduce sexual assaults.
For as long as single-sex prisons are necessary, assignment of trans-
sexuals to the prison of their gender identity remains a necessary
consideration. The most salient resolution in the prison assigmnent
debate is analogous to that in the marriage and divorce arena: cate-
gorization, when absolutely necessary, should follow gender identity,
not biological sex.
285. See e.g., ROTHBLATr, supra note 12, at 62-63 (explaining that hormonal injections are
available for males and females so that "[i]mplanting all inmates, regardless of genitalia, would
significantly reduce the chances of an accidental pregnancy"). Id. at 63.
286. Herbert, supra note 284, at 289 (commenting further that any attempts to impose celi-
bacy on inmates will prove futile). Also, despite higher vigilance, rape still occurs in high secu-
rity prisons.
287. Twenty-five to thirty percent of all incarcerated males are "actually sex offenders, re-
gardless of the crime for which they were incarcerated." Cindy Moy, Female Inmates Not Similarly
Situated With Men, Says Eighth Circuit, 1996 WL 667233, Nov. 20, 1996. When comparing the
overall male and female prison populations in Missouri, for example, "the female prison popula-
tion is significantly smaller (725 females compared to 13,000 males)." Id. These figures are even
less proportionate when race is taken into account. "Historically, smaller numbers of Black
women have been imprisoned than either white or Black men, however, significantly greater
proportions of incarcerated women were Black." Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Cime, 79
IOWAL. REV. 95, 106 (1993). The discrepancy between white and black female inmates can be
attributed, at least in part, to judges' reluctance to incarcerate white women, as opposed to
black women. Id.
288. Herbert, supra note 284, at 289 (emphasis added). Herbert further claims that "[bjy
proposing a desegregation remedy, [I do] not suggest that women must simply adapt themselves
to the existing structure of men's prisons. Desegregation should prompt a reappraisal of the
goals and practices of our penal systems and the role of women in those systems"). Id. at 290.
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VI. INCEPTION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Similarity is not the same thing as identity.
- Ibo Proverb
289
Whatever portable plurality she found, she organized into neat
lines, according to their size, shape, or gradations of color. Just as
she would never align a pine needle with the leaf of a cottonwood
tree, she would never put the jars of tomatoes next to the green
beans. During all of her four years of going to school, she was en-
chanted by numbers and depressed by words. She missed -without
knowing what she missed -paints and crayons.
- Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye
90
We need to look beyond the rigid sex and gender categories law
has fashioned for us, to oppress us, in order to re/construct a legal
system that embraces what's missing - the many ways individuals
identify. That is, the way we do gender. Through the marriage cases
and the prison assignment dilemma, I examined how law inade-
quately deals with this issue. The law classifies individuals on the ba-
sis of genitalia and completely overlooks chosen gender identities,
which are out of the control of laws and patriarchy. An important
part of challenging the status quo of patriarchal binary constructs is
stepping out of our own worlds to see and appreciate the rich tex-
tures, colors, and complexities of other people. We need to reevalu-
ate sex categories and value gender continuums.
While I believe we need to deconstruct the rigid bipolar models of
sex that form the basis of the legal understanding of "family" and at-
tempt to depolarize our concept of gender as male or female, I am
not suggesting a limitless continuum model. I find comfort in being
categorized as a lesbian, for example, insofar as the boundaries of
that category signal, at the very least, a resistance to heteropatriarchy.
Also, group membership can enable individuals to find energy in
others who are similarly situated or share similar experiences. Vol-
untary and asserted identity with a chosen group can be healthy.
The key is in understanding who is excluded when and where each
new line is drawn.
Obviously, differences of sexuality, gender, and race exist among
us. These are not, however, differences in identity until we make
289. GUMBOYA-YA, supra'note 109, at 104.
290. TONIMORRisoN, THE BLUEsr EYE 89 (1970).
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them so. Moreover, it is the desire to count oneself 'superior' to
another, or to count oneself 'normal,' that converts such differ-
ences into those specified identities in opposition to which we de-
fine ourselvesY9 '
I invite proponents as well as opponents of the gender identity
model to consider how and why we draw group distinctions. If lines
are drawn differently in private social groups as opposed to public
292group classifications, we should explore why that occurs.
Our goal should not be to create a blank continuum, either, which
fails to recognize and appreciate difference as well as sameness. Eve-
rything has its opposite always already defined within it. Just as Plessy
dealt with the arbitrariness of racial assignment, we need to look at
how we, and courts, arbitrarily deal with transsexuality, genital classi-
fications, and marriage. Marriage exists only because some people
remain, by choice or law, unmarried. Husbands are defined inappo-
site to wives. The concept of male exists only in relation to the con-
cept of female. Heterosexuality exists only in opposition to homo-
sexuality. Somewhere between these poles, however, is trans-
sexuality, at once male, female, neither and both. 2 3 The solution to
recognizing transsexual identities and transsexual marriages, both
socially and legally, is in relaxing the bipolar distinctions that serve
the patriarchal sexual family - to integrate a system that recognizes
sameness and difference while accepting fluid identities rather than
enforcing rigid sexual boundaries.
With respect to co-genital marriages in general, it is unclear
whether queers will win any heterosexual privileges not currently
available through domestic partnership laws. On one hand, we
may break down some of the ludicrous patriarchal facets inherent in
marriage laws by gaining queer rights to marry. That is, if co-genital
partners can marry, we destroy the one-penis-per-union rule and
courts will stop using our genitals as a basis to restrict access to some
heterosexual privileges. On the other hand, legal recognition of co-
291. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989), in SEXUAL ORi-
ENTAION AND THE LAW, supra note 142, at 271 (emphasis in original).
292. See, e.g., Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (holding that "[p]rotecting
[private] relationships from unwarranted state interference ... safeguards the ability inde-
pendently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty"). Accordingly, the
Court cites Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Fami-
lies, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). Id. See generally Hur-
ley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (1995) (ruling
that a statute mandating admission of a "parade contingent expressing a message not of the pri-
vate organizers' own choosing violates the First Amendment").
293. Bisexuality likewise exists along this continuum.
294. See supra note 147 (listing articles debating the value of same-sex marriages and domes-
tic partnership laws).
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genital marriages will legitimize same-sex couples who follow the
rules and marry, while a host of other sexual nonconformists will
remain excluded from those privileges. Nonmonogamous partners,
polygamous groups, and political nonconformists who refuse to beg
the state to sanction their intimacy should not be ignored and ostra-
cized by the queer community. Moreover, if we stop challenging the
gender and sex prescriptions currently intact in the legal concept of
marriage, we will at best gain entry into an institution that imposes
unwelcome, oppressive gender roles on us. For example, are we will-
ing to ask a lesbian partner to take on a male persona, or to do ver-
bal gymnastics, in order to get paternity leave when her partner has a
child?
The erasure and mistreatment of transsexuals under law compels
us to reconsider bipolar categories. "The frontier of liberty may have
expanded far beyond where it began, but for those without rights, it
always seems on the horizon, just beyond their reach."25 Wherever
law exists, categories will exist. Our task is to constantly challenge
and redefine those categories as progress demands.
295. Steve Silberman, We'reHere, We're Queer, and We've Got E-MaiI WIRED, Nov. 1994, at 76.
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